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Abstract 
 
This exploratory research was designed to understand how poor communities appropriate 
decentralization policies to raise their expectations of the state and consequently press their own 
agenda in development and poverty alleviation projects. Appropriating decentralization is 
conceptualized as the evolution of marginalized communities into empowered and self-advocating 
ones, capable of influencing the way the government operates in strategic planning processes by using 
the resources provided by state-sponsored, decentralized programs. Largely relying on qualitative 
method—using a combination of data collection techniques including in-depth interviews, focus 
group discussions, field observations and documents reviews—this research explores Indonesia’s 
Urban Poverty Project’s implementation in two kelurahans (sub-districts) in the city of Pekalongan, 
Central Java, Indonesia. This research discusses how a community organization can strategically plan 
movements to put its agents in the government and influences the governmental operation toward 
more democratic and accountable governance culture. It also highlights stories and perspectives to 
understand the complex process of planning negotiation where poverty and economic interdependence 
plays important roles in the “give and take” between community organization and external parties. 
This research suggests that communities can actively appropriate decentralization policy to further 
their own agendas within the decentralizing State’s frameworks and do not require a different 
planning process exclusive of governmental agents or the State’s influence. The communities studied, 
however, demonstrate that engagement with the State-run planning processes is very contested and 
multi-layered. A thin, fine line exists between community-government strategic alliance and the State 
co-opting civil society. 
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Glossary 
 
abangan nominal Moslems 
batik  Javanese wax fabric 
Bappeda badan perencanaan pembangunan daerah [local planning agency] 
Bappenas badan perencanaan pembangunan nasional [national planning agency] 
BKM  badan keswadayaan masyarakat [community self-help institution] 
bupati  regent 
camat  head of urban district administration 
carik   secretary of the kelurahan office 
CBO  community-based organization 
desa  village 
desakota urban village 
DPR  dewan perwakilan rakyat [house of representative, parliament] 
DPRD  dewan perwakilan rakyat daerah [local house of representative] 
Golkar  Golongan Karya 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HDI  human development index  
Inpres   instruksi presiden [president’s instruction] 
kelurahan urban sub-district administration 
kabupaten regency 
kota (madya) city 
KSM  kelompok swadaya masyarakat [self-help groups] 
kuli bangunan construction worker 
kuli panggul manual lifter 
LPM  lembaga pemberdayaan masyarakat [community empowerment body] 
LKM  lembaga keswadayaan masyarakat [community self-help organization] 
 ix 
LKMD   lembaga ketahanan masyarakat desa [village defense institute] 
Lurah   head of urban sub-district administration 
madrasah Islamic school 
ND  neighborhood development 
NGO  non-governmental organization 
NPO  non-profit organization 
NU  Nahdlatul Ulama 
Pamsimas  penyediaan air minum dan sanitasi berbasis masyarakat 
[community-based supply for drink water and sanitation] 
PAN  partai amanat nasional [national mandate party] 
Pantura  pantai utara [Java Island’s north shore] 
pesantren traditional Javanese Islamic boarding school  
petak  embanked field 
PKB  partai kebangkitan bangsa [national emergence party] 
PPP  partai persatuan pembangunan [united development party] 
P2KSBM percepatan pembangunan keluarga sejahtera berbasis masyarakat 
[family welfare acceleration through community-based development] 
PU  pekerjaan umum [public works] 
RT  rukun tetangga [neighborhood association] 
RW  rukun warga [community association] 
Sanimas  sanitasi oleh masyarakat [sanitation by people] 
santri  student of pesantren, also devout Moslems 
satpam   security guard 
sawah   wet paddy field 
TIPP  tim inti perencanaan partisipatif [core group for participatory planning] 
UPP  urban poverty project 
warga  citizen 
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I. Executive Summary 
 
Can communities move beyond performing the State’s agenda in poverty alleviation projects? Can 
communities appropriate decentralized poverty alleviation programs and divert the State’s agenda to 
press their own aims? Can communities advocate for their needs without engaging in a planning 
process separate from the state-run processes and exclusive of governmental agents? If so, how do 
these communities operate? 
 
This research seeks to understand how poor communities actively evolve into empowered and self-
advocating ones, capable of influencing the way the decentralizing government operates in strategic 
planning process for a pro-poor policy. Indonesia’s Urban Poverty Project (UPP) successfully 
transformed community self-help institutions (Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat [BKM] ) into 
community governance owning the capacity for collective action, increased efficiency in the delivery 
of projects’ resources to its beneficiaries, and prevented elite capture (Dasgupta & Beard, 2007, Beard 
et al, 2008). Potential for social transformation and reduction of elite control exists in denser, more 
populous urban areas, too (Beard & Dasgupta, 2006). However, this social transformation occurs only 
within the scope of the community. It does not represent transformation related to structural change, 
such as providing poor communities’ with bigger roles in shaping the way poverty alleviation projects 
and pro-poor policies are designed at a higher level. Dissatisfaction from communities’ isolated social 
transformations from the larger political process and the desire to witness a larger role for 
communities in the democratic urban governance motivates this research. 
 
Two different notions of advocacy planning emerge from academic planning debates. The first one 
treats planning as a profession, and frames advocacy planning as an activity performed by 
professionals. In this notion, inclusiveness and participation in advocacy planning applies to the 
process and substance, but not the actors of planning because professional planners are assumed to 
have authority to plan. The great contribution of literatures in covert, radical, and insurgent planning 
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is to offer the notion that planning can be practiced in invented spaces, more informal arenas where 
marginalized population can formulate sharper differences with the state’s and mainstream 
development agencies’ agenda. The two different notions can be summarized as professional vs 
citizen-grassroot planning. 
 
In Indonesia, planning is closely associated with the activity of the public sector. Indonesia has 
experienced major changes since the 1998 reformation and the ongoing demand for democratic 
decentralization. Hence, the most important part of the discussion on citizen planning is the authority 
transfer process from the State to citizen bodies. Literatures in decentralization have been extensively 
discursive about mechanisms for the State to transfer authorities to its sub-national entities, but there 
has not been equal amount of literature discussing how citizen bodies actively evolve to raise 
expectations in response to decentralization. This research uses two community self-help institutions 
(BKM) in the City of Pekalongan, Central Java, Indonesia, as case studies to fill that gap of empirical 
studies in advocacy planning.  
 
This research is an exploratory study of UPP and its community organizations’ evolution in the 
context of a decentralizing Indonesian government. Largely relying on qualitative research method, 
this research collected primary data through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and field 
observations. The researcher also reviewed community and municipality planning documents, plans, 
regulations and policy papers as a secondary data collection method. It aims to understand 
sociopolitical and historical factors influencing community organizations’ evolutions, as well as the 
interplay between insiders and outsiders in managing these projects. Through extensive discussions 
with BKM members and leaders, government officials, and UPP facilitators, the researcher 
documented their perception on poverty and created an inventory of past collective actions to 
accurately analyze community-level (BKM) planning, governance, and capacity for advocacy. 
 
This thesis organizes the observations and implications of these interviews into several subchapters. 
Stories of Pekalongan’s newly elected mayor, Dr. Basyir Ahmad, illustrate his dualistic role: as both 
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the state’s agent and as an agent of change representing community-based organizations’ interests. As 
a state agent, Dr. Basyir’s repertoire of action is limited to the rhetoric of a government’s agent: 
utilizing the authority to enact ordinances and operate in a legal framework. By refusing to work 
within the new framework—emphasizing on democratic citizen participation—government officials 
can maintain the status quo. Dr. Basyir’s election, however, exposed governmental agencies and 
officials to formidable structural and cultural change toward larger accountability, accessibility, and 
deferral toward local planning and governance. Drawing on his experience as community organizer, 
Dr. Basyir—known as “mayor of the people” for his egalitarian trait and pro-poor policy—acted as an 
advocate of change from within governmental institutions. 
 
Findings on the interviews with BKM Podosugih, a kelurahan in the city of Pekalongan, discuss the 
strong connection between two events: Mayor Basyir’s election in Pekalongan and a planned 
movement by BKM Podosugih to put its agents in legislative and executive government. This plan, 
tacit but exquisitely strategic and intensely coordinated, sought municipal governments’ recognition 
of community-based organizations (CBO) in its legal framework. This advocacy resulted in 
legislation, which mandated resource provisions for other communities to establish their own 
community-based organizations and made CBOs a strategic partner in the city’s poverty alleviation 
programs. Podosugih’s experience provides an exemplary model of how to successfully appropriate a 
decentralized poverty alleviation program. 
 
Stories and perspectives from Yosorejo, a kelurahan in Pekalongan, highlight its complex negotiation 
process to resolve flooding problems. Local people believed Kismatex, a textile factory, contributed 
to flooding of the surrounding neighborhood by destructing the indigenous drainage system. BKM, 
the area’s civic organization, advocated for the drains’ restoration in the negotiation process between 
local people—represented by BKM—and the factory, where Lurah (the sub-district administrator) 
acted as mediator. Throughout the negotiation process, Lurah influenced BKM’s ideas of who is 
responsible for (infrastructure) development and who deserves to benefit from development and 
poverty alleviation efforts. Lurah’s involvement, in the end, pacified the potential of aggressive 
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collective action. The case of Yosorejo also illustrates how local dependence on the factory’s 
employment provision (and the factory’s dependence on cheap labor) played important roles in the 
“give and take” of the negotiation. 
 
In the two observed communities, UPP emerges as an effective social planning instrument to develop 
community organizations’ collective criticism against the state’s agenda. Both communities exhibited 
strong beliefs in self-direction and resistance to the state’s prescriptions on development and poverty 
alleviation strategies. Their focus then shifted from addressing communities’ interests in their sole 
geographic boundaries to their locus in wider urban social, economic, and physical contexts. The two 
BKM actively appropriated decentralization policy to press their agendas. 
 
Abovementioned processes occurred within the decentralizing state’s frameworks and did not require 
a different planning process exclusive of governmental agents or the State’s influence. Moreover, 
communities can benefit from their engagement with the state by aggressively placing their agents in 
strategic governmental positions. Both communities observed, however, demonstrated that 
engagement with the state-run planning processes is contested with conflicting interests. A thin, fine 
line exists between community-government strategic alliance and the state co-opting civil society. As 
a result of this study, some gray areas between successful grassroots activism and community elitism 
also emerge. 
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II: Introduction 
 
 
A. What Have We (not) Learned from (State-Supported) Empowerment Programs? 
 
Can communities move beyond performing the State’s agenda in poverty alleviation projects? Can 
communities appropriate decentralized poverty alleviation programs and divert the State’s agenda to 
press their own aims? Can communities advocate for their needs without engaging in a planning 
process separate from the state-run processes and exclusive of governmental agents? If so, how do 
these communities operate? 
 
This research seeks to understand how—in an era of decentralization—poor communities actively 
evolve into empowered and self-advocating ones, capable of influencing how government develops its 
pro-poor policy in its strategic planning process. By establishing community board governance, 
Indonesia’s Urban Poverty Project (UPP) successfully transformed community self-help institutions 
(Badan Keswadayaan Masyarakat [BKM]) into owning the capacity for collective action, increased 
efficiency in the delivery of project’s resources to its beneficiaries, and prevented elite capture 
(Dasgupta & Beard, 2007; Beard et al., 2008). Potential for social transformation and reduction of 
elite control exists in denser, more populous urban areas, too (Beard and Dasgupta, 2006). However, 
this social transformation occurs only within the scope of the community. This transformation also 
does not address issues related to structural change, such as representing poor communities’ interests 
as higher-level officials design poverty alleviation projects and pro-poor policies. Dissatisfaction from 
communities’ isolated social transformations from the larger political process and the desire to 
witness a larger role for communities in the democratic urban governance motivates this research. 
 
Earlier studies that assert a marginalized population could learn to divert a state’s agenda and press its 
own (Geddes, 1999; Therborn, 1979; and Wood, 2001) through radical, sometimes covert, planning 
practices (Beard, 2002), inform this paper. However, this research examines this diversion process in 
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a different context. In contexts where an authoritarian regime reacts with hostility to threats of social 
and structural changes from its managed subjects, radical and covert planning proves highly effective. 
Because of their subversive planning goals, radical and covert planning actors’ relationship with state 
agents is often adversarial, and typically, they effectively operate outside state control and beyond 
state-planning processes. As Indonesia—the subject of this study—decentralizes and democratizes, 
avenues for bottom-up planning processes increase. Presently the Indonesian state, to a certain extent, 
welcomes citizen input. Compared with its authoritarian period, state agents and CBOs, the main 
actors of local development during a decentralization-democratization period interact in relatively 
cooperative and mutually beneficial ways. 
 
Despite the cooperative opportunities in a decentralizing state, the process of transferring planning 
authority and resources from the state to communities, representing a variety of agendas, still requires 
critical inspection. Although substantial amount of literature visualize decentralization of the state as a 
prerequisite for citizen participation that ultimately leads to democracy, efficiency, and equity (e.g. 
Agrawal & Gupta, 2005; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; and Ribot, 2002), it also can mask patronage by a 
central government (e.g., Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). In some cases, decentralization can even 
recentralize control, especially in natural resources management (e.g., Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson, 
2006). Therefore, this research explores possible processes for communities to develop the crucial 
skills necessary to assess their circumstances and decide whether to strategically conform, confront, or 
divert the state’s agenda. 
 
This research also attempts to understand the mechanism for communities to divert the state’s agenda 
without establishing a planning process separate from the state planning processes. While this 
research simultaneously values community autonomy in decision-making and praises planning 
conducted by non-state agents, it remains open to communities’ ability to plan within the state’s 
framework to effect larger change. 
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B. Why Decentralization in Indonesia? 
 
Widespread distrust toward former President Suharto, which led to a regime change in Indonesia, is 
still fresh in the nation’s memory and acts as a preamble to today’s decentralization. While O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1968) argue division and negotiation between hard-liner and soft-liner elites typically 
characterize regime change, Indonesia’s regime change highlights the role of non-elite actors (Ali, 
2001; Woodward, 2002). Asian financial turmoil between 1997 and 1998 sparked civil unrest in 
major Indonesian cities. Mass protests in different areas in Indonesia often led to violent incidents and 
represented a near-example of a class revolt. Life’s basic needs for most of the population were 
precarious. People from lower socio-economic classes plundered stores and businesses and attacked 
other groups assumed to be proprietors. Driven by the long, subtle, and latent social jealousy of 
Chinese descendants’ control over the Indonesian economy, this civil unrest also turned into racial 
attacks against them. The New Order regime could not provide protection and security for its citizens 
or overcome the crisis. 
 
Accusations of corrupt practices by the New Order’s bureaucrat and presidential family fueled the 
crisis (BBC, 2008). Citizens rejected Suharto’s offer of political reform (reformasi), and strengthened 
pressure for a change of national leadership. In an incident now referred to as Tragedi Trisakti,1 
political turmoil turned into widespread terror when military force killed four university students 
during a protest on May 12, 1998. Following this event, university student organizations saw the 
three-day period of presidential leave abroad as a window for bigger mass protest and occupied the 
National Assembly’s building. This event was followed by similar occupations in other provincial 
offices in Indonesia. Witnessing the largest mass political protest in 30 years of Indonesia’s history, 
the parliament recommended national leadership succession on May 20, 1998 (Kompas, 1998). That 
night, Suharto resigned. 
 
                                       
1 Elang Mulia Lesmana, Heri Hertanto, Hafidin Royan, and Hendriawan Sie died in Trisakti University campus 
in this event. Antara News, May 12th 2007, retrieved from 
http://www.antara.co.id/view/?i=1178940413&c=NAS&s=.  
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Effective and efficient resource exploitation rather than equitable distribution of the economic benefit 
of the exploited resources by the New Order regime created the strongest pressure toward regime 
change (see, for example Walsh, 2008). Some scholars consider the Regional Autonomy Law no. 22 
in 1999 as a major leap for democratic, participatory, equitable, and just distribution of economic 
benefits and a legal basis for greater community control of local natural resources management (e.g. 
Walsh, 2008). Simultaneously, the passing of Local-National Fiscal Balance Law no. 25, also in 1999, 
gave local government autonomy in political and fiscal decisions (Beard, 2008). 
 
However, in practice provincial level government and the national government struggled for power 
and control over resources, which provides little, if any, actual power to the municipal level 
authorities (Ferrazzi, 1998). On the other hand, donors, international aid agencies, and local 
governments extensively transferred power and resources to local and private institutions, including 
civil society organizations for the sake of bureaucratic efficiency and political stability (Ito, 2008). On 
a legal basis, by the dismantling of Law 5/1979 and Law 5/1974, and the passing of Law 22/1999, 
community actors gained more roles in community-level governance because desa (villages) and 
kelurahan (urban sub-districts) are no longer the smallest political administrative units (Antlov, 
2003). To date, no study illustrates the potential disconnect between municipal government and 
community organizations, although in practice, this notion is generally accepted. 
 
The Indonesian presidential administration quickly realized that administrative decentralization would 
not sufficiently moderate grassroots’ pressure from a substantial portion of the Indonesian population. 
Government officials anticipated civil unrest in response to their failure to overcome severe poverty in 
areas of the country, underscoring the urgency for a nationwide poverty alleviation program. 
Previously centralized, bureaucratically controlled mechanisms of job creation programs would not 
achieve their goal. Urban Poverty Project (UPP) as a community-based project emerged through 
designers with considerable experiences in non-governmental organization (NGO) operations, who 
were involved in the early stages of the project. Pungky Sumadi, the BAPPENAS (Badan 
Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional [National Planning Agency]) officer responsible for preparation 
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of the UPP with the World Bank, described how the Indonesian administration raced the clock to 
deliver the program in the shortest time possible to prevent more eruptive mass action: 
“I just arrived at my office on one morning in January 1998 when my supervisor at the Bureau 
of Urban Development, Settlements and Public Housing of the National Development Planning 
Agency (BAPPENAS) called me for a quick briefing… [T]he Chairman of the agency had 
requested [the]World Bank to support Indonesia with a nation-wide project to help severe 
unemployment in urban areas. The Chairman was concerned that…the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis…would lead to further protest and uprising. The World Bank agreed with the request... 
the project should be ready within…6 months. [N]ever in my 10-year experience of working on 
any World Bank project that a single project took less than 24 months.… I went back to my 
office with total confusion…. I had no experience… with local communities. We were highly 
centralized government. We are experts in giving instructions. Having realized that... I never 
had any experience with community work… I... recruit[ed] more people (consultants) to help 
BAPPENAS prepare the overall project design and operation manual…. By late May I 
presented the project to the World Bank project task manager. She initially did not agree with 
the concept since the World Bank’s mission was to create employment and job opportunities as 
soon as possible. After some long arguments,... she finally accepted. We named the project as 
the Urban Poverty Project.” (Sumadi, 2004) 
 
 
C. Urban Poverty Project as a State-Prescribed Community Participation2 
 
The UPP targeted four syndromes of poverty for its intervention on selected urban centers. It 
perceives poverty as a result of one’s disintegration with the rest of the population in terms of 
political, social, economic, and environmental structures, referred as poverty syndromes. A low 
economic status (indicated by low income) often leads to the marginalization of someone without 
social and political associations. As a result, low-income individuals are excluded from decision-
making processes within their community. In urban areas, there is a significant overlap between the 
three syndromes (political, social, economic) of poverty exhibited in marginalized living 
environments with poor public services and sanitary infrastructures. The four syndromes are self-
perpetuating hence UPP intervention needs to address all four poverty syndromes simultaneously. 
 
In an effort to be comprehensive, the UPP’s first three-year phase recommended three main activities: 
1) a microcredit scheme to address the lack of economic opportunities and to create alternative, 
                                       
2 This section, unless otherwise noted, summarizes the Ministry of Public Works’s “General Guide for Urban 
Poverty Project Phase 3.” R. Arief Rahadi, Sonny H. Kusuma, Adi Maadi, and Tri Maulana, contributors to this 
document, were the four consultants involved in the development of the initial UPP plan. 
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informal job creation; 2) infrastructure development, especially better sanitary infrastructures to 
improve public health and street paving to increase accessibility; and 3) social charities, as an 
instrument to help those without capacity to develop businesses. In the second three-year phase, the 
project also allowed housing improvement projects to increase poor people’s property value and 
provide them with asset ownership. In the third phase, 50 percent of each community’s funds are 
allocated for infrastructure development and 15 percent are allocated for social charities. The 
remaining funds will finance a microcredit scheme, where communities are required to retain 90 
percent of their microfinance fund after 3 years. This requirement attempted to remedy inexperienced 
community organizations’ previous experiences with financial management, where the UPP grant was 
completely distributed as a social charity and none of the microcredit budget was returned as a 
sustainable community capital. 
 
The project funds are given to a kelurahan, the smallest administrative unit of local government in 
Indonesia. It requires each kelurahan to establish a new community organization or modify an 
existing one and transform it into a community self-help institution (BKM) to receive and manage the 
project funds. BKM act as policymakers for UPP projects in their respective kelurahan, not serve as 
project managers. Instead, self-help groups (KSM, Kelompok Swadaya Masyarakat) implement 
projects through an ad-hoc committee for each special project. A kelurahan is typically subdivided 
into smaller units of communities and neighborhoods. Each unit has its own voluntary civic leader in 
a smaller neighborhood association (RT, Rukun Tetangga), and a larger community association (RW, 
Rukun Warga). Although BKM bears the name “community self-help institution,” it barely represents 
a cohesive community; rather, RT and RW typically represent much more cohesive and homogeneous 
population. 
 
To ensure fair representation, the project requires elections of volunteer members from the smallest 
basis of RT and RW levels, since BKM does not represent a cohesive community. The election 
process cannot involve any campaigning or self-nominations. A paid facilitator from the project’s 
regional management consultant assists in RT and RW meetings, where nominations for BKM 
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members occur to ensure the aforementioned conditions are met. At the next meeting, nominated RT 
and RW representatives then vote for 11 to 13 BKM members from themselves. One-third of BKM’s 
membership must be female; failure to comply with this protocol would result in the project’s 
termination in that respective kelurahan. However, after the BKM members are elected, they are 
given the responsibility and freedom to define their own constitutional rules regarding the election 
procedure for the upcoming three-year term and the criteria for judging proposals they receive from 
community members. This system allows for a high degree of variation in each community (Beard, 
2008).  
 
There are several key differences from the three phases of UPP implementation in Indonesia. In the 
first phase (2000-2003), each BKM in a larger kelurahan received approximately Rp. (rupiah) 1 
billion and the smaller ones received Rp. 250 million.3 The substantial amount of money distributed to 
kelurahans raised concern on potential government corruption. Hence the first phase of UPP was 
characterized by a strict requirement that a community organization cannot involve any governmental 
agents.4 UPP’s originators envisioned BKM as completely extra-governmental institution. 
 
In the second phase, (2003–2006), funding allocation was smaller (Rp. 200 million for kelurahan with 
less than 3,000 people and Rp. 500 million for kelurahan with more than 1,000 people), and BKM 
could co-manage the fund with kelurahan office, creating a more open relationship between BKM and 
the government institution. The project’s third phase (2006–2009) encourages strategic partnerships 
with government offices, completely changing the relationship between BKM and the state. This 
strategic partnership is not limited to co-management with kelurahan officials, but also includes the 
Local Office of Public Works (Dinas PU) for infrastructure development projects and Local Planning 
Agency (BAPPEDA) for planning and budgeting processes. To deal with limited resources UPP even 
encouraged BKM to cooperate with private entities, such as banks and cooperatives. BKMs with 
                                       
3 In 2000, the currency rate was around Rp. 10,000 / US$. Due to the financial crisis, however, this rate was very 
fluctuant. At its lowest level it reached Rp. 20,000 / US$. 
4 Despite this regulation, however, Beard and Dasgupta (2006, 2007) find that many of BKM members during 
UPP’s 1st phase were government employees or closely related with government institutions in some other way. 
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relatively high achievement in the previous three phases— established self-governance, self-reliance, 
and expandable social and professional networking—may compete for an additional Rp. 1 billion 
grant for neighborhood development program, specifically designed to facilitate community-based 
infrastructure development. 
 
BKMs’ relationship with their governmental counterpart exhibits an interesting dynamic, because 
decentralization law does not recognize this relationship; BKMs’ role as a community governing body 
is only required by the UPP scheme (see Figure 1 for an illustration of the dynamic relationship 
between BKM and its governmental counterpart(s)). First, although the UPP scheme prescribes that 
BKMs establish strategic partnerships with local governments, UPP does not force the local 
government agencies to comply with its requirement. In other words, BKMs needs to earn these 
strategic partnerships by developing their own networks and establishing their own contacts. This 
responsibility, of course, poses a great challenge for any BKM to represent their beneficiaries’ interest 
in negotiations with their governmental counterparts. 
 
Second, BKMs have no official legal standing to act as a community government. However, their 
operations echo cardinal principles of governance: elected memberships and the power to draft 
constitutional rules directing policies of program implementation. Thus, BKMs operate as if it is a 
community-governing body outside of the sub-district’s administrative government. Lastly, 
decentralization does not only refer to a legal system, but also encompasses a growing citizen pressure 
toward more government accountability. Because BKM members are democratically elected by 
community members, they can be held accountable while sub-district officials cannot. Therefore, 
despite no official legal recognition, sub-district administrators cannot easily contest BKM’s role in 
the kelurahan’s governance. 
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Chart 1. Institutional Model of the UPP 
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III. Theorizing Advocacy Planning 
 
A. Toward More Inclusive Planning in Poverty Alleviation: Advocacy or Insurgency? 
 
Addressing different voices in planning a city’s future is not a new idea, especially in the context of 
U.S. planning. Davidoff (1965), concerned with the increasing number of protests against racial 
discrimination against U.S. Blacks, encouraged planners to engage in a more democratic and inclusive 
process. He also argued that planners should engage in urban politics and play an active role as 
advocates for interest groups—a radical suggestion in the ‘60s. He envisioned planners as politicians 
who could be held accountable to their constituency or as lawyers who could be held accountable to 
their clients. According to Brooks (2002), two major elements define Davidoff’s advocacy planning 
are technical assistance and representation. Yet advocacy planning moves beyond these two 
elements.  
 
By playing the role of advocates, Davidoff believed the whole structure of planning would be 
revolutionized. An advocate planner who serves a particular interest group as a client would change 
the participation scheme, from citizens reacting to agency programs into groups proposing their 
concepts to be adopted as official programs. As early as the 1960s, Davidoff proposed that a) to 
address the plural needs of a diverse population, planners must be politically active; b) planning 
process must be inclusive, where citizen participation is a norm; c) the planning profession itself 
should include social and economic issues, not just physical planning; and d) planners should not fear 
the adversary nature of advocacy planning, because it would still benefit planning research, a constant 
learning process for all professional planners. 
 
Krumholz (1982), the Director of Cleveland’s City Planning Commission under the first Black mayor 
of a U.S. city, claimed that his planning staff consistently operated in an activist, interventionist style, 
with redistribution as its objective, making who became the mayor an unimportant fact. Implicitly, 
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Krumholz perceived planning as neutral to politics and power sharing. To Krumholz, equity, not 
advocacy, matters. In other words, who and how planning is performed, is not necessarily as 
important as providing choices to those who are most disfranchised and have little, if any, choices.  
 
Though regarded by many planning practitioners and academicians as noble and popular, advocacy 
planning had also been harshly criticized. Practitioners contend that advocacy planning, as an 
instrument to mitigate conflicts, leads to decision-making gridlock. Meanwhile, community activists 
considers advocacy planning to be a new, veiled colonial-patronizing behavior by planners (Brooks, 
2000). Piven (1970a) asserted that advocate planners have been alienated from beneficiaries, since 
typically they do not directly employ planners. She despises being an advocate as a profession, for 
professionalism was exactly what the typical beneficiaries of advocacy planning, i.e., people in the 
slum areas, do not have. Therefore other people from the outside brought their “expertise” to these 
populations. Ultimately, Piven believes professional advocate planners would serve the interest of the 
fund grantor instead of people they really are working for, and it would largely determine the outcome 
of the planning process. 
 
Rosen (1970) criticized Piven’s standing, arguing that professional assistance in advocacy practices 
did not always lead to domination and manipulation. More importantly, the continuing practice of 
advocacy planning is part of the long-term effort to integrate previously disfranchised populations 
into the political discourse of decision-making. Rosen pointed out that Piven’s (and other social 
workers and community activists) works are generally militant, advocating for change outside 
established channels, which would not promote integration. 
 
Piven (1970b) responded to Rosen’s critique, arguing that if advocacy planning does not serve the 
interests of beneficiaries, advocacy planning will not benefit the beneficiaries. Many years later, 
political scientists, like Young (2000), elaborated on this contention by pointing out the logic of 
identity in representation. No matter what, no one can speak on behalf of others as well as if others 
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spoke for themselves. To Young, participation is always superior to representation in a democratic 
system. Consequently, no matter how much technical assistance a planner offers, s/he cannot 
represent the voice of beneficiaries (unless s/he is one of them). 
 
Two different notions of advocacy planning emerge from this intellectual debate. The first one treats 
planning as a profession, and therefore frames advocacy planning as an activity performed by 
professional planners. Inclusiveness in advocacy planning applies to the process of planning, because 
it encourages citizen participation. It also applies to the substance of planning, because it challenges 
the social and economic structure of a plan that matters more than the physical aspects. However, in at 
least Davidoff’s advocacy planning framework, this inclusiveness does not apply to the actors of 
planning, because professional planners are assumed to have authority to plan. In short, those trained 
in the tradition of planning deliver a professional service. 
 
Hence, both Davidoff and Krumholz greatly emphasize planners’ education to ensure, once they leave 
school, they possess the mental framework to address equity issues and integrity to take a stand in a 
politically charged advocacy. This framework’s traditional definition of planning, where the planner 
prescribes both the goals and means of planning, garners the most criticism. Thus, sometimes 
planners may advocate policies that benefit elite populations, but not the rest of the population (Gans 
in Fainstein and Fainstein, 1996).  
 
The second notion is a little fuzzier. In the 1970s, the “alternative” to planning as a profession was not 
clearly defined. But Piven, among others, started one of today’s most important questions within the 
discipline of planning: Who should plan? The purest alternative forms to professional planning are 
covert, radical, and insurgent planning (e.g., Beard 2002, 2003; Miraftab and Wills, 2005; Miraftab, 
2006; and Sandercock 1998a, 2003). The three forms of this alternative planning are, of course, not 
mutually exclusive, but rather complementary concepts. Radical planning’s normative aim is the 
emancipation of humanity from societal and state oppression and market-generated inequality 
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(Friedmann in Beard, 2003). The actors of radical planning are the managed subjects of state planning 
and, at times, they may be the exact counteragents of the state. Radical planning is often conducted by 
insurgent citizens, a subgroup which is often less “visible” to the state (and consequently in planning 
processes), because of systematic denomination through historical imposition of a “righteous image” 
(Sandercock, 1998a, 1998b, 2003). To the anthropologist James Holston (1998), insurgent citizens 
include homeless people, migrants, minorities, even queer nations and ganglands. Holston believes 
that along these fault lines, the city is actually rooted in a dynamic society and heterogeneous lived 
experience. Radical and insurgent planning model often poses danger to its practitioners, because the 
authoritarian political system sees them as subvert and revolutionary. Therefore most of the time, they 
operate in a more covert manner (Beard, 2002). 
 
It is useful to see the distinction between radical and covert planning as different phases of social 
learning and social transformation, because as situation change, one type of planning may transform 
into another type. A covert plan, for example, on the surface seems to conform to the state’s agenda 
and follows the guidance of state agents. But if the repressive state weakens, it could easily culminate 
in a stronger radical movement (Tarrow, 1998). For example, a radical protest that youth organized 
from covert-planned, state-agenda–conforming, community library initiative in Indonesia illustrates 
this transformation (Beard, 2003). On the surface, a community library could not be perceived as a 
radical initiative. Rather, it conforms to the state’s agenda on the war against illiteracy. It is however, 
through this initiative youth learns about the contemporary sociopolitical situations and organizes for 
their own agenda of change and revolution. 
 
The most important contribution of literature in covert, radical, and insurgent planning is to offer a 
different theoretical and operational framework of planning beyond the formal, institutionalized 
planning framework. Citizen participation in formal planning processes can only be conducted in 
invited spaces, the arena where the state grants citizens the rights to be involved in state-validated 
processes. On the other hand, insurgent planning can be practiced in invented spaces, the more 
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informal arena where marginalized population can formulate sharper differences with the state’s and 
mainstream development agencies’ agenda and mobilize to disrupt these agendas’ implementation 
(e.g., Miraftab & Wills, 2005; and Miraftab, 2006). 
 
The notion of inventing new spaces for citizen participation becomes very important, especially when 
the state’s logic of social capital, participation, and empowerment are exploitive and manipulative. 
Miraftab (2004a, & 2004b), for example, documented how South Africa’s neo-liberal government 
masks its exploitation of a community-based waste collection scheme between 1997 and 2001. 
Promoted as a community empowerment program, it has exploited poor, Black female population 
through unpaid or underpaid labor for neighborhood waste collection while the more affluent areas 
received government-organized waste collection mechanism. 
 
Thus, from the lens of covert, radical and insurgent planning, it is necessary for grass-root 
organizations to operate beyond the framework of the state and, whenever necessary, to challenge it. 
Because the spaces for participation provided by the state are perceived as  non-viable options to 
channel grassroots’ interests, insurgent planning literature suggests and celebrates more informal 
mechanisms, such as social mobilization, mass protests, and other forms of collective action. 
 
To continue with this discussion one implicit assumption used in this literature review must be 
examined. Although formal, institutionalized planning can be easily associated with state activity, in 
reality, many private, for-profit institutions also operate within this framework. In fully developed 
countries, such as the United States, private institutions often provide services to real estate 
developers, and municipal governments often outsource parts of its planning to these institutions. To a 
certain extent, some of these private institutions can also provide services to communities. This 
research, however would not include these private institutions as part of its planning framework for 
one reason: It is necessary to eliminate the “middleman” in a planning process to clearly understand 
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled subjects—in this case the state and grassroots entities.  
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Especially in areas where planning is closely associated with the activity of the public sector (such as 
in Indonesia), it makes more sense to visualize this relationship more directly instead of being 
mediated. In this context, therefore, the three forms of planning (covert, radical, and insurgent 
planning) directly oppose professional planning, because they all view planning as a process 
conducted by extra-governmental agents and a process beyond the state’s control. 
 
By using  planning actors as the main criteria to draw the line between planning types and 
deliberately associating planners with the public planning agency, we then have at least two types of 
planning practices: the one performed by planners in state-run agencies, and the one performed by 
extra-governmental agents. We have excluded private, for-profit institutions from this framework, 
because they operate more like middlemen, hence leaving the ruled subjects, grassroots agencies, and 
poor people in the category of extra-governmental agents. The typology then could be simplified as 
state-planning vs citizen planning. Planning by state-run agencies and planning performed by extra-
governmental agents are, however, two utopian extremes and, in reality, planning practice falls along 
a continuum between these two ends.  
 
The shifts and transitions between these planning typologies also prove instructive. We are interested 
in the shift, not creating more subcategories within the typology, and hence our questions are: “When 
does a situation where planning is completely state-controlled and state-run turn into a process 
dominated more by non-state agents? What drive these non-state agents? What mechanisms do they 
use?  What are the prerequisites for this shift? “ 
 
To answer these questions, we must look at both ends of the equation, considering the series of events 
and shifts in paradigms for both the state and its agents and what happens to the extra-governmental 
agents as well. This shift is an active process instead of an occurrence. Hence, this question more 
aptly reflects this dynamic relationship: “Why and how would the state grant its planning authority to 
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non-state agents?” The reciprocal question would be, “Why and how would non-state agents be able 
to appropriate planning authority from state agents?” 
 
 
B. The Transition of the State: Debunking the Democratization-Decentralization Link 
 
A postmodernist worldview drives a substantial portion of the current planning literature. It moves 
away from a sense of order and rejects the claim that one could have complete comprehensibility, 
predictability, and rationality in planning (Brooks, 2000). In the past, modern planning had been 
associated with highly technical-rational approach. Consequently, it has also been closely associated 
with centralized, top-down, (sometimes) authoritarian, state operation. Following well-documented 
inadequacies of the modernist approach, skepticism emerges toward a centralized, top-down approach 
in policy and decision-making processes (Scott, 1998; and Tendler, 1997). In the 2000s, state 
decentralization is the norm in both academic literature and political movements. 
 
The shift toward more decentralized, bottom-up decision-making is prevalent in fields closely related 
to planning, such as community development (e.g., Ward, Solomon, Ballif-Spanvill, and Furhriman, 
2008) and community-based natural resource management (e.g., Agrawal and Chhatre, 2007; 
Etoungou, 2003; and Spierenburg, 2007). Separately, those interested in poverty alleviation also 
shifted from centralized, government-run programs as the solution for local poverty to locally 
managed, community-based microfinance programs (e.g., Chambers, 1994; Weiss and Montgomery, 
2005; Yunus, 1998; and Yunus and Webber, 2007). 
 
Competing claims about the benefits and the shortfalls of state decentralization exist as well. A 
substantial amount of literature visualizes state decentralization as a prerequisite for citizen 
participation, which in turn leads to democracy, efficiency, and equity (e.g., Agrawal and Gupta, 
2005; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; and Ribot, 2002). Others scrutinize decentralization and participatory 
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approaches in planning, project implementation, and evaluation as masked patronage by a central 
government (e.g., Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). Contemporary literature tends to heighten the scrutiny 
over decentralization since empirical studies have shown that this approach is not always equivalent 
with autonomous decision-making; hence (administrative) decentralization can actually lead to more 
centralized control, especially in natural resources management (Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson, 2006). 
 
What is more important than making a broad survey of competing claims is to understand the 
mechanisms of decentralization and their consequences. Ribot (2008) described at least two main 
ways decentralization occurs: through power transfer to local administrative government or to an 
authority that is locally accountable. Without accountability to local people, decentralization only 
changes the government’s structure, but not the relationship between government agents and their 
citizens.  
 
Therefore, the first mechanism would result in an administrative de-concentration, but a true 
democratic decentralization with meaningful citizen participation can only be reached through the 
second mechanism. Consequently, in addition to administrative process, a democratic process 
involves political decentralization (or devolution, as an alternative term). An election, for example, 
can return accountability of a local authority to its constituency. But power can also be transferred to 
any non-state agents, such as NGOs, non-profit organizations (NPOs), individuals, corporations, or 
even in some cases, to a customary authority for a specific purpose. Ribot (2004) strictly defined this 
third mechanism as privatization instead of decentralization because it applies the exclusive logic of 
public governance. 
 
Many empirical studies have shown that the choice of mechanism and the locus of power to be 
transferred, often referred by many scholars as the institutional choice of decentralization, plays a 
very important role in determining the outcome (Chhatre, 2007; Oyono, 2004; Ribot, 2002; and Ribot, 
Chhatre, and Lankina, 2008). For example, in Indonesia, for the sake of bureaucratic efficiency and 
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political stability, donors, international aid agencies, and local governments have transferred much of 
their power and resources to private local institutions, yet failed to promote government 
accountability and popular participation (Ito, 2007). 
 
It is very naïve to think that the transition from a centralized, authoritarian state would directly lead to 
democracy. Political scientists have shown that we should critically examine transition periods rather 
than where resources and power, among other things, go, implying that the declining regime is usually 
capable of shaping the transition and consequently makes it more elite-driven rather than mass-
pressured (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). This implication leaves scholars space to study elites 
during state transitions, especially in regime changes. This transition is characterized by negotiations 
and agreements between regime elites and moderate opposition elites, typically political leaders of 
opposition parties, the protagonists in this process (e.g., O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; and 
Przeworski, 1991). 
 
In the transition to democracy, both politicians and common citizens must have some common 
attitudes and some distinct attitudes (Rustow, 1970), but to date, little literature suggests conclusively 
how the process of democratization should be structured (Cheibub, 2009). Commenting about this 
transition, Linz (1996) asserted that a complete democratic transition should lead to a consensus on 
political procedures to elect new ruling government; the pressure for autonomous association or 
anything less merely constitutes liberalization. The key is in the choice of institution to exercise 
power after the transition. Przeworski (1988) provided great insight into this mechanism: 
 
“This, then, is the answer to the original question. Democratization, understood as a discrete 
step of devolution of power from the authoritarian power apparatus to institutions that permit 
an uncertain interplay of forces, is possible if there exist institutions that provide a reasonable 
expectation that interests of major political forces would not be affected highly adversely under 
democratic competition, given the resources these forces can muster. Substantive agreements 
are possible only if they are institutionally guaranteed because institutions mold the prior 
probabilities of outcomes. The leaders of conflicting political forces can agree to the actions of 
institutions while they cannot agree to substantive outcomes in the absence of institutional 
guarantees.” (Przeworski,1998) 
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C. Defining the non-state agent: Transforming the Community, Shaking the Elite 
 
This thesis’s central question is “What would it take for a population of non-state, non-elite agents to 
be able to appropriate the planning process?” The focus of this section is to find out how that 
population transforms itself so it can socially mobilize in a strategic manner to reach a desired goal. In 
essence, we need to learn how a population learns to plan. 
 
Rather than relying on political elites to drive change, political scientists have also proposed that 
mobilization by economically and socially marginalized populations (insurgents) and the working 
class through popular protest could force initial liberalization and eventually democratize the regime 
(Therborn, 1979; and Wood, 2001), especially during economic downturns (Geddes, 1999). Woods’ 
(2001) work provides a counter-state, counter-elite framework for an insurgent path to democracy. It 
is useful to understand “elites” as not only those whose power is defined by state-official positions 
(Woods would call this regime elites) but also those who, through coercively disciplining institutions, 
could prevent or prohibit others from mobilization. These institutions include, but are not limited to, 
(manipulative) labor organizations, social and cultural hierarchies, and economic classes. Woods 
(2001) wrote: 
“In this insurgent path to democracy, sustained mobilization by poor and working-class people 
transformed key interests of economic elites, leading to pressure on the state to compromise 
with the insurgents, thereby strengthening regime moderates over hard-liners with the result 
that negotiated transitions to democracy followed.” 
 
Although Woods wrote in the context of labor mobilization for a regime change, we could expand her 
conception as an analogy in social mobilization for a planning action. In Woods’ framework, the 
elites are the proprietors of economic resources and the authoritarian regime, while in planning the 
elites are the state planners. In Woods’ framework an authoritarian regime transitions to a democratic 
one, while in our framework, the state-run planning process transitions to an all-inclusive planning 
process. 
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Because of the claim that a relatively large group will not be able to act in cooperative and 
coordinated manner (Hardin, 1968 and 1998), the biggest puzzle of this framework is the idea of 
coordination and cooperation among individuals in a population. Chamberlin (1974), in his attempt to 
confront the belief that individuals in a large group could act in coordinated and cooperative manner, 
based his theory on different notions of economic goods: public and private.5 Chamberlin found that 
individuals’ decision to cooperate with other individuals in the group is determined by the type of the 
goods they are looking for. The more exclusive and rival a good is, the more selfish individuals would 
act against each other in the group. The more inclusive (when the good can be shared) and the more 
non-rival (when the use of the good does not prevent others from using it) a good is, the more 
individuals tend to cooperate to obtain the good. In summary, individuals work together when they 
share an interest. Still, however logical and persuasive, this study had not answered why and how 
some groups reach a consensus about what constitutes a common interest. 
 
Chamberlin’s study uses individuals as the unit of analysis instead of examining the group as an entity 
for a collective action—a major gap in his study. To address the actor of development as a group 
entity, the body of planning and development literature assumes planning could be done or driven by 
a “community” (see, for example, Agrawal, 2001; Cameron, 2003; Mathie and Cunningham, 2003; 
Ribot and Mearns, 2005; and Zeuli and Radel, 2005). In this context, a community is a “small spatial 
unit with a homogeneous social structure and shared norms” (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999) capable of 
making decisions and acting collectively. For practical purpose, in this thesis the terms collective and 
community will be used interchangeably, not because the richness of the two concepts should be 
discounted, but because the framework in this paper uses community as its main unit of analysis. 
 
                                       
5 In economic perspective, a private good is characterized by its exclusionary and rivalry attribute. Public good 
is, on the contrary, inclusionary and non-rival. For better explanation, see Weimer, David L. and Aidan R. 
Vining. Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice (4th ed.). Pearson: Prentice Hall, . pp. 72.  
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The idea of community-based development planning addresses the gap of Chamberlin’s cooperative 
people theory. To fill that intellectual gap, scholars have proposed the broad concept of social capital. 
This concept emphasizes the quality of relationships, level of trust, and complexity of social networks 
among actors in a collective social group (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2004; Daniere et al., 2002; Dasgupta 
and Serageldin, 2000; Grootaert and van Bastelaer, 2002; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Woolcock, 
1998; and Woolcock and Narayan, 2000).  
 
The concept of social capital, however, does not provide an understanding of the dynamism of social 
relations. Relationships among community members and individuals in a collective are not static and, 
to a certain extent, are bound to change. Arguably, the main goal of any social planning intervention 
itself is to shake the static and adherent social structure and, whenever possible, advocate for 
transformation. The chief purpose of this social transformation is to, whenever possible, eliminate (or 
at best, reduce) elite control in collective action and community-based development. The second goal 
would be to give the insurgent citizen more space in the public sphere and, whenever possible, bring 
them into the planning landscape and collective action. 
 
Previous studies show how difficult it is to achieve inclusion. Beard (2005 & 2007), for example, has 
found that in Indonesia citizen participation is prescribed by the underlying family and gender roles 
and hence it is not evenly distributed among heterogeneous members of the communities. However, 
establishing an elected community board to govern the community and manage collective actions 
helps prevent the elite group from systematically corrupting collective action and intervening with the 
community’s interest, a process often called the elite capture (Beard and Dasgupta, 2006; Dasgupta 
and Beard, 2007; and Beard et al., 2008). 
 
Specifically, for Indonesia’s Javanese population, Beard and Dasgupta (2006) found that collective 
action at the community-level is highly determined by the relationships among multi-scalar social, 
political, and historical factors, internal and external to communities. Within the UPP, they have 
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identified two distinct forms of collective action. The first form depends on community cohesion and 
stable social relationships in addition to a stagnant social hierarchy, typically found in rural 
communities. The second form relies on a shared perception of interdependent future and a shared 
desire for change, sometimes associated with the urban population. While both forms of collective 
action effectively deliver services in poverty alleviation projects, only the second form demonstrates 
potential for social transformation. 
 
 
D. Theoretical Framework: Appropriating Decentralization, Triggering Self-Advocacy 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2: A Theoretical Framework: Appropriating Decentralization 
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The main criticism of Davidoff and Krumholz’s advocacy planning framework is that people with 
different interests should not be prevented from self-expressing those interests. Debates should not 
take place behind planning agencies’ closed doors and exclusively involve planners. Instead, a public 
sphere, where all citizens have space to negotiate their interests through a dynamic process of 
bargaining and compromising with planning agencies, should exist. Because negotiation’s very nature 
requires more than one party, ideal negotiation requires that advocacy is conducted as an exogenous 
force driving planning instead of endogenous process directing planning. In short, borrowing Young’s 
logic of identity, if one is a (state) planner, s/he cannot be an advocate. Conversely, an advocate 
should ideally be an agent outside the planning authority. The question that follows then is: “Who 
should be the advocate?”  
 
This particular question cannot be answered without visualizing the process being conducted in a 
democratic state context—an  underlying assumption of citizen participation and advocacy planning.  
However, not all populations live in a democratic state. Scholars of covert, radical, and insurgent 
planning have contributed the most in authoritarian or falsely democratic states. Radical planning can 
be conducted in the universe where its agents do not trust the state to promote structural change or 
equity. In an authoritarian context, the landscape of citizen planning is extraterrestrial to any state-run 
processes. Its practices do not involve any of the state’s agents or  agencies and, to a certain extent 
citizen planners’ relationship with the state is adversarial. When a state is falsely democratic, it 
provides options for citizen participation with manipulative agenda, such as labor exploitation. In this 
context, citizen planning covertly conforms to the state’s agenda. However, citizen-planners maintain 
a critical view of the state’s agenda and ensure that control over planning intervention remains within 
the hands of the citizens. Whenever the authoritarian state weakens, citizen-planners engage in more 
radical approaches to disrupt the state’s agenda and press their own. 
 
The difficulty of applying either advocacy planning or covert, radical, and insurgent planning in this 
research lies in the dynamic transformation of the state. Indonesia, as the locus of this study, is 
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experiencing major shifts after its 1998 regime change. While the claim that it has been completely 
democratized may be challenged, Indonesia is definitely no longer an authoritarian state. To a certain 
extent, the state has opened up windows of opportunities to citizen participation, such as establishing 
of community-based poverty alleviation through the UPP. 
 
The transfer process of power and authority from the state to the citizen becomes very important. 
While a majority of political science and planning literature has discussed how the state could transfer 
its power through administrative de-concentration, democratic decentralization, or merely liberal 
privatization, not much discussion about how communities could actively appropriate this 
decentralization to gain larger control over the planning processes exists. As Kohl and Farthing 
(2008) described, although decentralization can be seen as a catalyst for citizen participation and 
enrich the repertoire of political actions by marginalized groups, its main goal is to develop their 
ability to mobilize people and to raise new citizen’s expectations of the state. 
 
Covert, radical, and insurgent planning methods have effectively promoted social transformation as a 
prerequisite for establishing larger spaces for citizen participation. Instead of only using invited 
spaces offered by the state through formal planning processes, covert, radical and insurgent planners 
operate in these newly invented spaces through informal methods of collective action and social 
mobilization. By celebrating the use of informal politics as a space for citizen participation, covert, 
radical, and insurgent planners remain independent from external interests, from state and other 
entities, such as corporations. 
 
Does this mean that opportunities that the state offers through mechanisms of decentralization should 
be considered as a last resort of citizen participation? In short, the answer is “no”. I am not suggesting 
that citizen planning processes should necessarily be immersed in state planning. Communities should 
not become the state’s agents in a non-state planning and development process in the era of 
decentralization. It is necessary to maintain the balance by staying outside the state’s political borders 
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to be able to effectively negotiate with it. More importantly, it is crucial to critically assess the state’s 
proposition and rhetoric, an advantage of being an extra-state agent. However, framing the state as 
entity in transformation, non-state agents cannot afford to lose the chance to influence the state’s 
operations by using the channels afforded by decentralization. 
 
That being said, appropriating decentralization still should be an active, conscious, and strategic 
process with a clear agenda. This research’s goal is to explore possible modus operandi for non-state 
agents, i.e., community organizations to appropriate decentralization to press their own agenda upon 
the state without losing the opportunity to use official channels. We have identified the following 
assumptions: 
1. Community-based organizations could channel the interest of beneficiaries in a bottom-up 
process and act on behalf of them to balance a top-down approach from the state. 
2. Covert, radical, and insurgent planning literature had taught us that there is a potential benefit 
for non-state agents, i.e., community organizations, to stay exclusive from the government 
structure in order to effectively negotiate with it. 
3. The state could administratively de-concentrate or politically decentralize. However, only 
political decentralization mechanisms return accountability of authorized officials to citizens 
and lead to democratization. 
4. In the event of political decentralization, the state transfers its power to a locally accountable 
authority. For community organizations to gain power and still operate outside the state’s 
structure, they must attain this power from a privatization mechanism. 
5. State agents cannot be expected to be advocates, simply because of their association with the 
state. 
6. State planners will not be able to represent the interest of beneficiaries, i.e., poor people. A 
mechanism for beneficiaries to self-express their interest and participate in a decision-making 
process is superior to any form of representation. 
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7. Because state agents cannot be advocates or represent the interest of beneficiaries, the state-
planning agenda will not represent the community’s interests. 
8. Lessons from empirical studies in covert, radical, and insurgent planning practices help us 
understand the process of social learning by community organizations to divert the state-
conforming planning agenda and set their own. 
9. This social learning process involves a social transformation by the emergence of a new 
critical group questioning the power of the community and state elite. 
 
This study proposes a more nuanced form of non-state planning agents’ operation: 
1. The process of social learning will lead to the emergence of “new advocates.” 
2. The new advocates are the newly formed community elite group. They are from the 
community and not external actors with a patronizing behavior, such as NGO workers,  
project facilitators, or  state planners, who play an advocate’s role. They are instead “self-
advocates.” 
3. Non-conformity to the state’s agenda does not characterize the actions of self-advocates. 
Rather, they are strategically decisive about when to conform and when to confront state 
actions, and they are critically capable of appropriating the state’s agenda of decentralization 
to press their own agenda. 
4. More importantly, the new advocates are also willing to continuously shift in between the 
framework of formal planning offered by the decentralizing state and informal, citizen-
centered planning framework as envisioned by covert, radical, and insurgent planners. 
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IV. Research Methodology 
 
A. Research Approach 
 
Appropriating decentralization as a theoretical planning term is relatively new. Kohl and Farthing 
(2008) offer this term to illustrate a process where the state-supported decentralization process gives 
leeway for larger citizen participation in wider spaces than the state prescribes, in the end, raising new 
expectations of the state. Studying political decentralization in Bolivia, Kohl and Farthing found that 
decentralization could catalyze social mobilization of a marginalized population to adopt political 
actions at municipal level. 
 
This recent proposition opens new spaces, albeit unexplored ones, in planning literature on 
decentralization and its planning implications. Literature on decentralization planning, for example, 
has not yet explored the different mechanisms that a state uses to decentralize and the different forms 
of citizen’s political activism that result from these mechanisms. It also has not explored how 
decentralization policy awakens a marginalized population, triggering its ability to mobilize, socially 
and politically. The evolution of marginalized populations involves a very complex process of 
collective social learning. This thesis, then, provides an exploration of the step-by-step mechanisms 
through which a marginalized, urban poor population learns to organize its self-help institution, 
formulate its interests, devise the best solutions to achieve these interests, and negotiate with 
government agents and other private parties to further their aims. 
 
Three reasons underlie why this research was conducted in an in-depth, qualitative, exploratory 
manner. First, appropriating decentralization, as defined by Kohl and Farthing, is a theoretical term 
without a practical application focusing on community-level, self-help institutions. A study of its 
application needs to address complex processes while relevant variables had not been identified for 
such a purpose. Second, Indonesian society is culturally unique and potentially exempt from the 
conventional wisdom of citizen planning as formulated by U.S. planning theorists. Therefore, this 
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research must be able to adapt to different social norms and perceptions about citizen planning, a 
relatively new term for Indonesian planners. Third, the use of “appropriating decentralization” as a 
planning term requires a paradigm shift from seeing planning as an activity exclusive to the state to 
planning as a more inclusive process with citizen participation, in this case driven by community self-
help institutions. 
 
Naturally, planning processes in the domain of community organizations are less formal and less 
structured compared with those in bureaucracy or institutionalized, private planning organizations. 
Sometimes, I discovered that informal linkages between events, processes, and key actors in the 
community provide more valuable insight than the formally stated goals by governmental agencies 
related to UPP management. In summary, the unique context of decentralization in Indonesia and the 
setting of urban poor people in a semi-traditional city in the Island of Java required descriptive and 
more exploratory research methods to ensure flexibility, while still providing practical guidance for 
engagement with the studied communities. 
 
This research uses the cultural perspective to provide an in-depth understanding of the 
decentralization mechanism and the underlying collective social learning that occurs simultaneously 
with it. To fully understand how the two communities studied could appropriate decentralization 
policy, I spent two and a half months traveling between the two areas in Pekalongan. This time 
allowed me to understand the local culture of each place, key planning actors in each community, and 
their individual behaviors, as well as their social interaction with each other. It also helped me to 
understand the subtle differences in verbal and nonverbal communication to confirm, clarify, and 
sometimes challenge claims made by key planning actors who I have interviewed for the purpose of 
the research. 
 
This research recognizes the potential of local variations among different communities, and it is not 
intended to create generalizations in the field of community development planning that would 
discount those local variations. Rather than making cross-comparisons between the two sites, I 
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preferred to delve into the complex interactions between local culture and local politics in each 
community. This approach allowed me to understand how a specific context can affect the process of 
collective social learning that in the end influences community organizations’ relationship with their 
governmental / private counterparts in planning negotiations. 
 
 
B. Site Selection Process 
 
Prior to the fieldwork in the two communities studied, I conducted pre-interviews with key 
informants, including the UPP concept developers and main policymakers in BAPPENAS 
(Indonesian National Development Planning Agency) and the national consultant for UPP 
Management. These interviews focused on four elements: 1) decentralization as a context; 2) the 
UPP’s evolution; 3) sociopolitical and historical factors; and 4) the internal-external issue of UPP 
management. First, I explored key informants’ understanding on how decentralization shaped the way 
the UPP was designed. Second, I explored the different phases of development of the UPP and the 
key informants’ understanding on how periodic assessments of BKM operations influenced the design 
of UPP’s next phase. Third, I explored the differences of social, political, cultural, and historical 
factors found in the implementation of the UPP and how it affected the general policy of BKM 
governance. Last, I explored the role of facilitators and the possibility of emerging community 
members’ resistances toward them as external actors in a community’s development. 
 
Based on the responses I received during the last set of interviews, I revised my focus from economic 
development to the interplay between internal-external agents in UPP implementation. I looked at not 
only relationships between community members and UPP facilitators, but also between them and 
government agents / other private parties. The information from the interviews directed me to explore 
mechanisms communities use to develop self-advocating capacities. 
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To have a broad survey of UPP implementation in all areas of Indonesia, I participated in a three-day 
training program for UPP’s advanced city-level coordinators and senior facilitators. During this event, 
I conducted six structured interviews (using the same questions posed to key informants) with senior 
facilitators and city-level coordinators. Five shorter, less-structured interviews with a different group 
of facilitators and city-level coordinators were also conducted to confirm claims made by participants 
in structured interviews. Through these semi-structured and less-structured interviews, a pre-finding 
emerged: The relationship between BKM members and Lurah could determine the result of UPP 
intervention in the respective kelurahan. 
 
Based on these interviews, I developed a key informant interview guide, a focus group discussion 
guide, and personal guidelines for field observations to help me obtain information that would 
illuminate the relationship between BKM members and Lurah. I visualized this relationship as the 
representation of local negotiation between community and government agents. Veteran trainers and 
senior facilitators recommended I investigate UPP implementation in Central Java, where a 
patronizing governmental culture, reminiscent of the old Javanese social structure, meets the newly 
established egalitarian, community-oriented governance. To me, these interactions represented a clash 
between the new and the old elite. 
 
I selected Kendal, a hinterland of Semarang—the fourth largest city in Java after Jakarta, Surabaya, 
and Jogjakarta, as the first site after hearing that the Bupati (regent) was imprisoned on corruption 
accusations. The Bupati’s imprisonment was a result of widespread pressure through mass grassroots 
demonstration. In other interviews, I learned that Kendal was an exemplary model of empowerment 
and social mobilization. I expected to find a link between this event with UPP intervention and the 
process of social learning it had facilitated. 
 
Following a recommendation from the city-level UPP coordinator, I focused on two of the most active 
and vocal BKMs, Plantaran and Kebondalem. These localities are completely different in terms of 
types of people and attitudes toward government. BKM Plantaran’s members are mostly laid-off 
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workers from a local textile factory, while most of BKM Kebondalem’s members are government 
officials. Both demonstrated amazing achievements in advocating for their community members. 
BKM Plantaran approached at least five different governmental offices to negotiate resources for 
training programs for their unemployed and underemployed community members. They also stood 
against the local rice conglomerates, demanding no price mark-ups in the market. BKM Kebondalem 
demanded tuition waivers for poor children to attend local school. 
 
While inspiring, no evidence linked these movements and the fall of the Bupati—or any other 
structural change in Kendal. The administrative definition of the community’s geographic location 
bounds these movements. While BKM Plantaran and BKM Kebondalem are excellent project 
managers and most people agree they delivered UPP’s resources to constituents in an effective way, 
this research is primarily interested in how their involvement in UPP trained them to perform self-
advocacy at a higher level of the planning process, not in their respective territories. 
 
I redirected my project to Pekalongan, a city 50 miles to the West of Kendal. Evidence links the 
election of a newly, pro-poor mayor, with strong connections to local BKMs, and some movements 
from BKM Podosugih’s cadres to put their agents in the government. Through pre-interviews, I 
learned that BKM Podosugih advocated for a legislation that established BKM as the government’s 
main strategic partner in poverty alleviation–related programs. This process led to the establishment 
of BKM in all kelurahan in Pekalongan and the adoption of UPP as the city’s poverty alleviation 
program. I compare BKM Podosugih’s experience with BKM Yosorejo’s advocacy for the restoration 
of indigenous drain systems in a local land-use, environmental conflict (local flooding) against local 
textile factory. 
 
These two BKMs are comparable in two ways: Both BKMs demonstrate capacity for financial 
management and fair representation of community (RW) and neighborhood (RT) in BKM meetings—
two criteria of good community governance. First, sound financial management often indicates less 
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corruption in the management of UPP money. Second, a good community government requires equal 
representation among different sub-community populations in the decision-making processes. 
 
Quantitative measures can be derived from these two criteria of good community governance. To 
reflect sound financial management, the regional consultant for UPP management required a 90 
percent retention rate for its microcredit scheme after 3 years.6 Both BKMs had retention rates of 
more than 100 percent, where the initial capital investment accrued interest, showing the 
organizations’ professionalism in financial management. In terms of community representation, both 
BKMs’ administrative and the city-level UPP consultants’ records report more than 80 percent of 
their meetings involve RT and RW representatives in addition to BKM members. These quantitative 
measures on both BKMs’ financial management and community involvement complemented initial 
interviews about the similarities between the two BKMs.7 
 
 
C. Researcher’s Role Management 
 
As researcher gathering information from others with face-to-face interaction, I was required to 
negotiate my entry into each communities and governmental offices (with formal and informal 
gatekeepers) and make sure I did not offend the unwritten social rules. Being an Indonesian native did 
not guarantee acceptance from government officials or instant connections with the community 
members. The city-level coordinator of the UPP, the first key person who introduced me to BKM 
members in the two communities, was helpful when dealing with government agencies. While I was 
usually introduced as a student at an American university, people welcomed me better when I told 
                                       
6 This requirement means that after three years, the BKM must not have a financial loss exceeding 10 percent of 
the whole microcredit fund. In short, the retention rate measures a BKM’s capacity to manage the microcredit 
fund. Retention rate differs slightly from the credit return rate, which shows the percentage of debt paid. 
7 I followed recommendation by facilitators who had served in both kelurahans. Desi, a local facilitator, and 
Ratna, the city-level coordinator, for example, confirmed that both BKMs had actively conducted participatory 
decision-making processes by getting involved in RT and RW meetings, or vice versa. Facilitators are typically 
subject to rolling assignments, so they can provide insight into differences among BKMs. 
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them that I once studied and worked for the University of Indonesia, and welcomed me best when I 
said that my ancestors were from the area. 
 
While the customary social norm is speaking kromo, the softer, more aristocratic version of Javanese 
language, my inability to speak it made conversations with BKM members, who were typically much 
older, difficult. Although I avoided using an interpreter, I did take a local resident, who I introduced 
as my “cousin”, with me every time I met with community members. While she broke the ice and 
made informal conversations, I explained that I had lived in Jakarta for my whole life, accounting for 
my inability to speak kromo, and asked permission to do the interviews and focus group discussions 
in the formal Indonesian language. 
 
In interviews and focus group discussions, I needed to constantly shift position between being a 
student and an expert. As soon as community and BKM members learned that I was a graduate 
student at a U.S. university, they often deferred to my judgment and withheld their own perspectives 
on our discussion subjects. To avoid this, I sometimes intentionally pretended not to understand a 
very basic principle about UPP implementation and let my research participant teach me about the 
subject. This technique gave participants more confidence to voice their perspectives without bias. On 
the other hand, I needed to demonstrate my knowledge and familiarity with formal concepts and 
regulations of decentralization in Indonesia to government officials. If I failed to do so at the 
beginning of my interview with any government official, s/he would spend hours lecturing me on 
decentralization minutiae. 
 
Building trust and managing politics were big issues in this research. For example, I also needed to 
convince government officials that I did not work for any NGOs because they had negative 
preconceptions about them. They typically perceived NGOs as provocative organizations and their 
involvement in local governance often leads to political instability. BKM members, to a certain 
extent, also shared this preconception and feared that any interaction with NGOs would harm their 
relationship with the government. Even though I emphasized that this research was solely intended for 
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personal academic use, to build trust, I needed to become involved in their social lives, visit their 
homes, meet their families, and engage in informal conversations unrelated to my study. While 
building this trust was time-consuming—I often had to spend time more than I initially planned for 
the interview sessions—this experience helped me to delve into and understand the cultural life of my 
research participants that my research questions could not reflect. 
 
 
D. Data Collection Techniques 
 
I used a combination of data collection techniques, which relied on qualitative research methods, to 
allow me to triangulate community planning actors’ conflicting claims.  Interviews, focus group 
discussions and participant observations were used as primary data collection methods. Interviews 
allowed research participants to reflect upon recent changes in their communities. The result of each 
interview produced each research participant’s perceptions about decentralization and their 
community’s exposure to this process. Focus group discussions were conducted to explore four 
themes: gain an understanding of community’s perception on local poverty; gather an inventory of 
past collective actions; learn about community-level governance and planning; and analyze a 
community’s advocacy efforts. These focus group discussions helped each research participant to 
confirm, clarify, and sometimes challenge each other’s claims that interviews alone could not 
document. Through community planning meetings and daily interaction with the BKM staff, I also 
observed social interaction, hierarchy, leadership, and potential divisions and conflicts among 
community members. 
 
To ensure my information about dates, plans, and processes was accurate I also reviewed documents 
on relevant community and local government contracts, regulations, planning guides, and other types 
of planning documents. I consider the document review process as secondary data collection method. 
 
 
 39 
In-depth interviews 
 
I conducted nine in-depth interviews with community members in each kelurahan and eight 
interviews with elites at the city level, and I recruited the two populations in completely different 
ways. Using a snowballing technique, I selected interview participants from community members in 
each kelurahan. To gain access to people in the kelurahan, either a BKM member or a local resident, 
I first needed to interview the both BKM coordinator and Lurah, the informal and formal information 
gatekeepers, respectively, in the community. Formal introduction by the city -level UPP coordinator, 
whom I contacted before initiating interviews, was important in this process. Both Lurah and the 
BKM coordinators would then recommend people who could provide supplementary information. 
These sources would then recommend another person as a research participant and so on. Meanwhile, 
I selected interview participants at the city level by targeting elite actors with specific office positions 
related to UPP operations, including the mayor, the head and secretary of city planning agency 
(BAPPEDA), and the head of the city poverty alleviation program. A top-ranking UPP facilitator and 
three city-level UPP coordinators comprised the rest of my interview participants. . 
 
While the number of interviews for elite source persons was predetermined, I only stopped 
conducting interviews with community members when I started receiving redundant information. In 
both kelurahan, this occurred after the ninth interview. In both kelurahan, I made sure I interviewed 
at least the BKM coordinator, some BKM members and UPP facilitators, and at least one local 
resident to gain different perspectives. 
 
Interviews explored: 1) decentralization as a context; 2) the UPP’s evolution; 3) socio-political and 
historical factors; and 4) the internal-external issue of project management. Each of these interview 
points was then developed into three open-ended questions.8 While these interviews explored the 
same four themes, I conducted them in completely different manner for community members and city 
elites. While interviews with city elites were conducted in formal and structured manner, interviews 
                                       
8 See the Appendix for a full list of interview questions. 
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with BKM members were conducted in very informal way, often resembling friendly conversations. 
Because of their administrative, social, or political position, interviews with elites were conducted in 
their respective offices while interviews with community members occurred in variety of informal 
places: in the kelurahan office, in their houses, in the mosque, sometimes in local food stalls. 
 
None of my research participants received monetary compensation for their involvement in this 
research. In Javanese society, monetary transactions are considered as harmful to the relationship 
between friends. Elite participants were promised, however, a hard copy of the completed thesis, and I 
often gave inexpensive foods and merchandises to community members who participated in my 
research. 
 
All of these interviews were audio-recorded with the interview participants’ consent. Because some of 
community member participants were from low-income groups, it was necessary to protect their 
identities. To this particular group, to protect their identities and welfare (and in turn, encourage 
participation), I opted to audio-record rather than write our conversations; similarly, I obtained oral, 
rather than written, consent. For the same purpose, throughout this document, pseudonyms will be 
used for almost all research participants. However, because elected officials, including BKM 
members and coordinators, are accountable to the public, their names and responses were disclosed in 
every research notes and audio-recordings. 
 
Focus Group Discussions (FGD) 
 
I conducted two FGDs in each kelurahan. Each FGD was conducted with a small group (3–5 
participants) of at least one BKM member, one local resident, and one UPP facilitator. One FGD was 
also conducted with 20 UPP facilitators as a broad survey to determine variations among BKM 
operations throughout Pekalongan. Although UPP required females represent 30 percent of BKM 
membership, in reality it was very difficult to invite women to focus group discussions. Only two 
women participated in FGDs in Yosorejo, and no women participated in FGDs in Podosugih. In 
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contrast to male facilitators, more female facilitators participated in the city-level FGD. 
 
BKM coordinators in each kelurahan were very helpful in inviting people to participate in the FGDs. 
Most participants were invited through informal ways, such as text messages and personal calls. 
Sometimes, a BKM coordinator contacted them and introduced the scope of the research being 
conducted and the FGD process—so that I would not have to. The BKM coordinator’s involvement 
was an effective mechanism to raise interest in the discussion, as well as build trust between me—as 
the discussion moderator seeking information—and FGD participants. 
 
All of the discussions explored 1) participants’ perceptions of poverty; 2) past collective actions; 3) 
community-level (BKM) planning and governance; and 4) participants’ personal ideas about 
community advocacy. Each of these four points was developed into 3–6 open-ended questions 
intended as a guide to lead and moderate the discussion.9 The actual discussion was often conducted 
in less structured manner. Similar to the interviews, the discussions were audio-recorded with the 
participants’ consent. Although participants in the group vary from low-income community members 
to BKM coordinators and UPP facilitators, they all were asked to consent orally, and pseudonyms 
were used for all FGD participants. 
 
Observations 
 
I participated in BKM community meetings and took daily observation notes from June to July 2009. 
The observations focused on the dynamics of the decision-making process and relationships among 
BKM members, their governmental counterparts, and their beneficiaries. Through these observations, 
I experienced the daily life of community organizations and gained information on the cultural setting 
that underlies their organizational behaviors. 
 
 
                                       
9 See the Appendix for a full list of focus group questions. 
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Document Review: 
 
Observations and interviews often did not provide specific dates, plans, and processes. A review of 
solicited documents—contracts, memorandum of understandings, annual plans and surveys, annual 
organizational reports—from BKM administrative records and city-level UPP management provided 
much of this information; newspapers and other materials from the print and online media were also 
reviewed.  
 
The following table summarizes the data collection for the purpose of this research: 
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V. Description & Findings 
 
 
A. Pekalongan as a Context 
  
 Map 1. Republic of Indonesia in the world  Map 2. Central Java Province in Indonesia 
 
 Map 3. City of Pekalongan in Central Java Province 
 
1. A Place in Transformation: Regional Agro-Industry to National Textile Center 
 
Pekalongan, after Batavia, Surabaya, and Semarang was the most important port for the Dutch 
colonial government, because it was the main exporter of sugar cane production on the northern coast 
of Java (Ingleson, 1983) and the largest tax base in Java on the 18th century (Ricklefs, 1986). The 
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port later was incorporated as an urban municipality by the colonial government between 1915 and 
1921, separate from the Regency (Kabupaten) of Pekalongan (Cobban, 1993). The old Sultanate of 
Mataram once occupied Pekalongan because it was part of a very agriculturally rich region of Kedhu, 
Tegal, and Cirebon (Carey, 1997). Pekalongan-Tegal region supplied at least one-tenth of colonial 
Java’s sugar cane production between 1800 and the 1940s (Knight, 1999; Bosma & Knight, 2004). 
 
The industry grew extensively after European manufacturers started using large mills and modernized 
production at the turn of the 19th century, consequently replacing the previous Chinese manufacturers 
with smaller production scale (Fernando, 1999). The Java sugar industry then started to play a key 
role in the world sugar market and Pekalongan’s pre-modern enterprises started to transform 
themselves into more capital-intensive ones with professional division between ownership and 
management (Knight, 1999) The colonial industry drew the greater part of its workforce with 
underpaid (Knight, 2006) and forced labor (Elson, 1986: 151) from the growing numbers of rural 
landless people (Knight, 1988). Yet, even landholders’ entire holdings were exploited, because 
factories often rent the whole village for their plants (Knight, 1994). This new capitalist production 
scheme also created the Indies bourgeoisie, starting the development of social transformation (Knight, 
1999). The worldwide Great Depression in the 1930s brought the sugar industry’s previously stable 
expansion to a halt (Brown, 1994) and put thousands out of work in urban Java (Ingleson, 1988). 
 
Less record is available on Pekalongan’s non-agricultural economy, but earthenware and bamboo 
works were major exports in Pekalongan during the colonial period.  While villagers made gold and 
silver fineries and brass wares, these goods were typically for their own use (Fernando, 1996). At 
least until 1820, most people produced their own clothing, although the quality of batik was high 
compared with the coarse area standard (Fernando, 1996). The number of pasars (marketplaces) only 
increased dramatically after the 1830s growth of the sugar industry and the local tradition of trading 
and crafting, including batik possibly grew during this time. Because of colonial privileges to selected 
insiders and a culture of cronyism, Chinese traders were well off until the end of Dutch period when 
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Indonesian traders start to take over the market in Pekalongan (Kwartanada, 2002). The batik industry 
kept growing until the Japanese occupation between 1942 and 1945, where no less than 20,000 batik 
workers in Pekalongan alone were unemployed (Sato, 2006). Post-independence, in 1968, the purse 
seine was introduced to Indonesia’s Java Sea, giving the city a head start in the regional and national 
fisheries industry. In the 2000s, Pekalongan is well-known as a regional and national textile and batik 
center, and the principal port for central Java where sugar, rubber, and tea are exported (Columbia 
Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Edition, 2009). 
 
While the Kabupaten (regency of) Pekalongan is still predominantly agricultural, Kota (city of) 
Pekalongan has become more urban in character. Over one-third (and growing) of its previously 
sawah (wet paddy fields) and petak (embanked field) lands have been converted into residential and 
commercial land uses as a response to the demand of its population of 250,000 (and growing). Its 
previously agricultural economy transitioned into a more industrial one. Its economy now revolves 
around the textile industry, where thread spinning, fabric manufacturing, manual and mechanized 
weaving, manual batik drawing and printing, and ready-wear garment industry comprise its outputs. 
Combined with fisheries, Pekalongan’s textile industry is worth at least US$2 million in annual gross 
domestic product (Pekalongan City Government website, 2009). 
 
Its population size may give a false impression of Pekalongan’s physical characteristics. Pekalongan 
is an example of a desakota, a term popularized by McGee (1991, 2008) to visualize typical South 
East Asian urban areas.10 Land use patterns in desakotas typically alternate—between agricultural and 
residential, residential and commercial, residential and industrial—giving it a sense of “in-between” 
rural and urban character. This physical characteristic also represents the dualistic character of social 
life—traditional and modern—creating a mixed culture in Pekalongan. For instance, the regency 
                                       
10 The term desakota comes from the merger of the Indonesian words desa (village) and kota (city). More 
elaborate discussion about desakota and social dualism can be found in Leaf (1996). Recently this term had 
been used to represent the dualistic character of cities in a larger context of the Asia-Pacific region. A 
substantial number of scholars have also used it in their studies of Chinese cities, (e.g., Guldin, 1996; Tang and 
Chung, 2002; Marton, 2002; Heikkila et al., 2003; and Yichun et al., 2007) Thai cities (e.g., Sajor and 
Ongsakul, 2007; and Hirsch, 2009), even Ghana (Yeboah, 2000) and Tokyo (Desbois and Le Tourneau, 1999). 
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branded the place as kota santri, reflecting its strong traditional Moslem culture, while the city 
branded itself as kota batik, reflecting its place as a production center for a unique batik tradition 
comparable to Jogjakarta and Solo.11 Put another way, while the city associated itself with its 
industrial life, its neighbor still associated its culture with the word santri, which refers to a traditional 
Moslem believer on the island of Java related to agriculture (Sebastian, 2003: 431). Compared to 
abangan (nominal Moslems), the santri community is seen as devout Moslems, affiliated with either 
moderate organizations Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) or Muhammadiyah (Desker, 2002).12 
 
 
 
Picture 1. Alternating Land Uses: residential, commercial, and agricultural 
Picture 2. The Informal Economy of Transportation 
Source:  Personal Documentation, June 2009. 
 
The city of Pekalongan is economically attached to its surrounding villages by a regional commuting 
pattern, further emphasizing its mixture of urban and semi-rural culture. Presently, Pekalongan draws 
its labor from the city itself, while other workers commute from Batang (on the East), Wonopringgo 
(on the South), and even Comal, which is 10 miles away to the West. People commute daily through 
Pantura with motorcycles, although exact statistical information on this trend is nonexistent.13 
 
                                       
11 Santri refers to a student of a Javanese Islamic traditional boarding school (pesantren). 
12 Geertz (1960) and Koentjaranginrat (1985) provided a very extensive discussion of the santri / abangan 
(kejawen) variations in Islamic religious practices in Java. 
13 Pantura (Pantai Utara) refers to the 1.316 kilometer street line on the northern shore of the Island of Java, 
connecting the ports of Merak in West Java to Banyuwangi in East Java. Most of the line was a reminiscent of 
De Grote Postweg (The Great Post Way), built under Governor General Daendels during the Dutch colonial 
period to move Dutch troops in the colonial war against the British. 
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2. A Government in Transformation: Participation in Progress 
 
Newly Elected Mayor: New Vibe for the Culture of Local Government  
 
Dr. Basyir was very popular in Pekalongan even before he ran for, and eventually was elected, as the 
mayor. People in Pekalongan associated him with generosity and charity: As a general physician, he 
charged low prices for his service. Some of interview participants claim of hearing that if a poor 
person comes to his practice, he would not charge him, but would rather give him money instead. 
Some others say that he often helps pays for poor people’s children to go to school. He was well 
known with his motto: “serving the poor will make God love you.”14 
  
After his election, because of his accessibility, Mayor Basyir was called “mayor of the people.” For 
the first time in Pekalongan’s history, a commoner could meet the mayor simply by making 
appointments with his office secretary, seeing him at his house or visiting him at his general 
practice.15 He claimed that this trait could be traced back from his involvement in community 
organizations, including serving as head of LPM (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat [Community 
Empowerment Body]) in kelurahan Sugihwaras.16 In our interview, he frequently pursued to convince 
me that he actually belongs more in the community than in a government’s office. He repetitively 
mentioned that he was “supposed to serve the people,” which accentuates his belief in direct 
connection between the executive officer and his constituency. 
                                       
14 For a very urban place like Pekalongan, this story is overwhelmingly widespread. I did some unstructured 
interviews with UPP beneficiaries at the local traditional market, and, to my surprise, most of them at least had 
heard their peers confirming Pak Basyir’s reputation as a generous practitioner. 
15 Satpam (security guards) in the mayor’s office enthusiastically confirmed that they were told not to prevent 
any people from visiting the mayor. They were specifically ordered to respectfully lead anybody to the mayor’s 
secretary. A BKM member told me another story: “Pak Basyir once left a meeting with the Governor of Central 
Java because he was scheduled to meet BKM members. This was very uncommon in the bureaucratic culture 
and to a certain extent was considered rebellious.” 
16 LPM (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat [Community Empowerment Body]) was envisioned as the main 
institution that organizes people as the main partner of the government in development. It is the most recent 
adaptation of the New Order’s LKMD (Lembaga Ketahanan Masyarakat Desa, Village Defense Institute). 
Central Bureau of Statistics defined LKMD as “an institution in a village that origins from, by and for the 
community. It is also a mode of the community participation in development, that combines various government 
activities and the pioneer of swadaya (self-help) mutual community help in all life aspects in developing the 
National defense that covers ideology, politics, economy, social, culture, religion and security defense” (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, 1993). 
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Dr. Basyir also exhibited skepticism about democracy’s representative model. He mentioned several 
times that executive officers now are bound to serve the legislative members instead of serving people 
directly. More than once he alluded to the utopian model of democracy, where he could directly talk 
to people and hear what they need and want. 
 
According to government officials in the planning agency, the whole bureaucracy was overhauled 
under Dr. Basyir’s leadership, and he transferred some of his personal egalitarian values into the 
bureaucracy’s operations. Most of government officials are now required to be much more accessible. 
Every city government official within the second and third echelon in every single bureau is now 
assigned a territory to supervise.17 They are personally and professionally responsible on the Human 
Development Index for that particular territory, transferring the bureaucratic responsibility to personal 
officials and requiring them to be more attached to the people from that territory.18 To date, however, 
their responsibilities are limited to coordination with territorial administrators (Lurah and Camat) for 
planning in education, the poverty index, and health services. 
 
Dr. Basyir identified difficulties in changing not only the bureaucratic structure, but also its culture as 
well. His employees’ skills (or lack thereof) pose the greatest challenge, in his opinion. Most of the 
higher rank officials are hold over from the New Order’s nepotistic regime, and most of them lack the 
qualifications to assume their governmental positions. For example, they are typically not well trained 
in strategic and territorial planning and accustomed only to the financial budgeting scheme. They 
typically work on a project-based administrative assignment and are not very “client-oriented;” in 
other words, they work for their supervisors, not the people. Dr. Basyir called this reform effort “a 
                                       
17 A head of governmental bureaus (e.g city planning agency) is ranked as 2nd echelon. A one rank position 
below this position (e.g a section head) is classified as the 3rd echelon. A more comprehensive explanation is 
provided by the Ministry of State Apparatus’ decision num. 62/KEP/M.PAN/7/2003: 
http://www.pu.go.id/satminkal/itjen/hukum/kmPAN62-03.htm.  
18 The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of human development that is published by the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The HDI provides an alternative to the common practice of 
evaluating a country’s progress in development based on per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). For recent 
report on country HDI refer to The Encyclopedia of Earth: 
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Human_Development_Index.  
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personal battle between the newly elected mayor with the strain of the languid government culture.” 
But the mayor claimed that shifts have occurred slowly, mostly because he did not succumb to that 
strain, but rather swiftly altered it. BKM members and local facilitators confirmed Dr. Basyir’s 
commitment and pursuit of his ideals.19 
 
Pak Basyir’s explanation on the success of a community-based development model in Pekalongan 
emphasizes the government’s devolution into a more decentralized and participatory system. He 
firmly believes that the government becomes more open to community organizations’ operations after 
decentralization. To him, the government “granted” the opportunity for community organizations to 
develop. In his own words: 
“Philosophically, lower level [government and community-base] institutions know 
better about their locale’s issues than the higher level [institutions], hence I need to 
grant autonomy in decision-making process to them, although [we] need to 
continuously work side by side to fix all organizational problems [associated with the 
lower level institution]. But we [the government] cannot and is not supposed to solve 
all issues like poverty. It’s their [the poor’s] own responsibility to solve the problems. 
I think UPP is a very good program because: 1) It delegates the [government’s] 
authority of budgeting, planning and implementation to a lower [community-level] 
institution; 2) It creates an ideal organization with strong rootedness to the RT 
(neighborhood) and RW (community) level; 3) [The] UPP provides facilitation to 
empower themselves to plan and take responsibilities of the implementation; and 4) It 
accelerates development from planning to execution.”  
  
 
A Concrete Step for Community-Based Development Support: Legislation Provision 
 
City Ordinance No. 11 / 2008 on Family Welfare Acceleration through Community-Based 
Development (P2KSBM) was Dr. Basyir administration’s main contribution to support the 
community-based development model in poverty alleviation. This ordinance, as Dr. Basyir claimed, is 
a legal statement of the city government’s commitment to a bottom-up planning and development 
process in poverty alleviation projects. His past experience as a community organizer understandably 
                                       
19 To illustrate this shift has indeed occurred one focus group discussion participant told a story about a visit 
from BKM members from Jogjakarta. He said, “Those guests were so surprised to know that the head of the 
planning agency and the mayor used to exchange text messages with BKM members (to discuss a community 
project). In other cities, it’s so difficult to even schedule a meeting with government officials.” 
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influenced the ordinance’s emphasis on capacity building for community-based organizations.20 This 
formal statement ensures future mayors must follow his legacy, because legislations embody it. 
 
In this ordinance, five main long-term goals have been set for the purpose of advocating for pro-poor 
policy: 1) The city should help children from poor families access to education (through high school); 
2) The city should support healthcare for poor families, especially pregnant mothers and toddlers; 3) 
The city should support the development of local infrastructure; 4) The city should encourage poor 
families to establish micro-businesses and small businesses through skills training; and 5) The city 
should advocate for stronger community-based development organizations to fulfill all the goals 
outlined above. The ordinance specifically mandates a partnership between the government and 
community self-help institutions (BKM) to perform these goals through mid-range participatory 
planning processes with the city providing necessary resources and facilitation.21 
 
Although it is difficult to discern whether this ordinance affected community-based development, it is 
interesting to see the incremental changes governmental agencies have made. This ordinance, for 
example, mandated the city government to advocate for communities’ autonomy in decision-making, 
planning, budgeting, and implementing poverty alleviation projects.22 Pak Choirul Mustofa, the head 
of city planning agency, acknowledged that his bureau is exposed to formidable adaptation of their 
role to conform to the recent policy. Planning becomes more decentralized as autonomy is transferred 
to Kelurahan to plan locally. Through the Acceleration Program, this autonomy comes with dedicated 
financial provision from Bappeda.23 This way, every local project can be implemented locally without 
                                       
20 Chapter I: General Provision, Article 12 of the Ordinance: “Capacity building for independent community 
organizations is Pekalongan City Government’s commitment through the facilitation of Community Self-Help 
Organizations (LKM).” This article does not particularly refer to BKM because of the issue of legal semantics: 
BKM is an organization established by the UPP project under the Ministry of Public Works and is not legally 
recognized by the Indonesian government administration. 
21 This paragraph summarizes Lembaran Daerah Kota Pekalongan Nomer 12 Tahun 2008. 
22 Chapter V: Main Programs, Article 14 of the Ordinance: “Acceleration for Poor Families in Business is 
Pekalongan City Government’s commitment through facilitations and advocacy for training and access to initial 
capital.” 
23 Bappeda (Badan Perencanaan Daerah [City Planning Agency]) 
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waiting for budget approval, a process that is sometimes politically charged.24 By executing their 
plans without delay, something that typically happened when Bappeda was the gate keeper of budget 
allocation, communities’ participation in development was encouraged, because their involvement in 
planning processes in Kelurahan would lead to tangible results of project implementation in their 
areas. 
 
Pekalongan City Government’s Take On Participation and Equity 
 
The unequivocal motive for the city government to encourage people’s participation is to compensate 
their limited resources in project implementation. Participation means that some part of the 
government’s responsibility in development is delegated and shared with community organizations, 
which means that financial support and labor constitute participation. Community-based projects are 
also considered better compared to government-run projects because it increases a community’s 
ownership over a project’s outcome, which they tend to maintain even without the government’s 
financial support. Ultimately, involving community institutions in development also emphasizes the 
government’s perspective on project implementation: Communities deliver projects in a faster and 
more efficient way. In Mayor Basyir’s own words: 
“More [people] helping and working for development is better. [Now that they’ve 
become so efficient] if you give Rp. 100 million [for a project] to a contractor, you 
would get [a product worth only] Rp. 50 million. If you give it to communities, you 
would get [something worth around] Rp. 150 million. If they could do it better, why 
should we waste our resources [by hiring contractors]?” 
 
Because of their efficacy and efficiency in project management, sometimes city government uses 
community organization as their extended arm. For example, when the national government could not 
provide its annual Rp. 25 trillion subsidy for kerosene and required a national conversion to liquid 
petroleum gas (LPG), the city government “outsourced” the task of conducting citizen information 
                                       
24 Andi Jeneng Warsito, a senior staff at Bappeda Pekalongan, shared an insight about how politics could 
interfere in decision-making process because every project proposals need to be approved by DPRD (local 
parliament). He claimed that this would indirectly hinder participation because DPRD had the final decision, 
and that not every community plan would be approved. By direct autonomy in kelurahan, this tendency of 
political interference would be moderated. He also claimed that the Acceleration Program is unique to 
Pekalongan and many other regional governments already started to imitate this model. 
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sessions to BKM, using BKM’s resources and personnel in Kelurahan offices and in community 
spaces to reach more community members.26 
 
Because participation is almost always understood as equivalent to contribution, government 
programs that require community participation are not always without resistance. Lurah (sub-district 
administrator) Purwanto of Podosugih, for example, once refused to accept the implementation of 
Sanimas, a national program for sanitation in impoverished urban cities, because it would require his 
kelurahan to provide 6 square meters of land for the water tower and another 100 square meters for 
the purification facility.27 Despite its urgency, the kelurahan believed that the cost of providing that 
amount of land in an urban setting like Pekalongan was an excessive burden to their people. However, 
the program did proceed in Podosougih with a negotiated condition that some of the facilities would 
be built on a structure above the riverbanks, instead of requiring people of the kelurahan to acquire 
new land. This story is not unique to just kelurahan Podosugih or its particular project. Many 
kelurahans in Pekalongan also refused to implement Pamsimas, another water supply and sanitation 
program under the Ministry of Public Works.28 
 
Pak Kajelan, a senior official at city’s planning agency and coordinator of Pekalongan’s Core Group 
for Participatory Planning (TIPP) explained that these repercussions were not completely 
unreasonable.29 Most Lurahs were concerned with the equity issues. Services, which supposedly 
                                       
26 Although it sounds exploitive, some BKM members whom I have interviewed share a sense of pride on their 
reputation as efficient “project managers” and do not mind the extra burden of work. 
27 Sanimas (Sanitasi oleh Masyarakat [Sanitation by People]) is a national program of Ministry of Public 
Works, partially funded by AusAID and a World Bank loan. Pak Kajelan provided an account on Lurah 
Purwanto of Podosugih’s refusal to fund Sanimas. 
28 Pamsimas (Penyediaan Air Minum dan Sanitasi Berbasis Masyarakat [Community-Based Supply for Drink 
Water and Sanitation]) is another Ministry of Public Works program funded through a World Bank loan. On its 
website, the program aims to deliver water services to regions with extensive rural areas and low fiscal capacity 
by a demand responsive approach. “Demand responsive” is where the project would provide facilities while 
potential beneficiaries would be willing to partially contribute to the facilities’ construction cost and 
maintenance. For more information, refer to the Pamsimas website, 
http://www.pamsimas.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=42. 
29 TIPP (Tim Inti Perencanaan Partisipatif  [Core Group for Participatory Planning]) is an ad hoc group at the 
city level, established under the umbrella of the UPP project to execute participatory planning processes in 
neighborhood development projects. Neighborhood Development (ND) is the final phase of UPP with more 
emphasis on participatory planning in urban infrastructure decisions. To date, only Kelurahan Podosugih has 
received the grant of Rp. 1 billion (US$ 100,000) in Pekalongan. 
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subsidized poor people, would actually financially burden them. Pak Kajelan admitted that not all 
government officials reach that in-depth level of thinking about equity issues in the implementation of 
government projects. To him, reaching a truly equitable solution would require a detailed local 
knowledge of people’s economic situations. He referred to the Podosugih case, where the Lurah 
needed to raise money from communities adjacent to the community where the Sanimas project 
would be built. Because sanitation affects not only personal but also public health, the economically 
well-off adjacent communities should help the less economically advantaged community, because 
they would indirectly benefit from the project. 
 
Pak Kajelan also explained that to moderate resistance, sometimes government agents needed to limit 
the number of people involved in decision-making processes, consequently hindering participation for 
a greater purpose of avoiding decision-making gridlock. According to him, an open forum is not ideal, 
because most of the general public almost always reacts negatively to minor impositions, and does not 
always respond positively when searching for both feasible and equitable solutions. Most of the time, 
inviting only the most vocal stakeholders in public decisions to a smaller meeting to craft preliminary 
solutions and then offering these solutions to the general public allows for better outcomes. To 
illustrate his point, he spoke about his involvement in the implementation of Sanimas and Pamsimas 
in Podosugih: 
“We need to be very strategic when dealing with a situation like this. Not only 
Lurahs, even [the supposedly resourceful] consultants were also stumbled [upon this 
situation]. But I did not lose my optimism. We need to convince people that we need 
to implement this because our beneficiaries’ interest in this kelurahan is at stake. 
However, gathering the general public too early would be counterproductive because 
it would raise powerful resistance. I believe that if all the important stakeholders, 
especially those whose opinion is influential to the public, sit down together to confer 
with each other we could find the solution.30 Finally the four of us met here (pointing 
his own table) to discuss. It’s easier to explain to a stickler this way (making hand 
gestures illustrating personal conversation).  We finally had an idea: The water tower 
could be built on the river with a very skinny structure so it would not block the river 
flow. We still had an issue with the 16 percent financial contribution required by 
Sanimas at that time, but then I suggested that they could use the Acceleration Fund 
that was about to be granted next year. Because this project would also benefit poor 
people who would not be able to afford private water supply by PT PAM, I think the 
use of that fund would be justified. Some other times and in other kelurahan, it’s not 
                                       
30 Pak Kajelan used the word rembug that is more nuanced than rapat. Rembug means more than meeting to 
discuss something. In Javanese society it bears the cultural meaning of meeting in a sense of kinship. 
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always that easy. Sometimes I have to go to people’s places just to make a 
conversation and to listen to their concerns.”  
 
 
Summary: Pekalongan City Government’s Transformation 
 
Dr. Basyir illustrates his dualistic role: as both the state’s agent and as an agent of change 
representing community-based organizations’ interests. As a state agent, Dr. Basyir’s repertoire of 
actions is limited to the rhetoric of government bureaucracy, such as passing ordinances. By 
refusing to work within the new framework—emphasizing on democratic citizen participation—
government officials can maintain the status quo. To a certain extent, this internal drive for change 
is also subject to a cultural challenge: Some governmental officials were accustomed to the state’s 
old paradigm, where participation was synonymous with (labor and financial) contribution. This 
paradigm can turn decentralization into an instrument of exploitation: Community-based 
organizations provided underpaid labor for the city government’s poverty alleviation projects. 
 
Dr. Basyir’s election, however, exposed governmental agencies and officials to formidable 
structural and cultural change toward larger accountability, accessibility, and deferral toward local 
planning and governance. Drawing on his experience as a community organizer, he used the 
territorial assignment of administrative officials as his main instrument to forcefully 
institutionalize governmental agents to work closely with community representatives. Hence, this 
increases community organizations’ ability to access officials, and consequently, provided larger 
space for their activism and negotiation with the state. In this case, Dr. Basyir acted as an advocate 
of change from within a governmental institution. 
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Chart 3. Summary of Pekalongan’s Governmental Transformation. 
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Map 4. Situating Kelurahan Podosugih and Kelurahan Yosorejo in the City of Pekalongan 
Source: Pekalongan City Administrative Map. 
Areas situating Kelurahan Podosugih & Yosorejo and the Pantura lines were added by author. 
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B. Alliance or Co-optation? BKM Yosorejo on Environmental Advocacy 
 
1. The Conflict: A Planned Environmental Disaster 
 
PT Kismatex, a textile factory located in Yosorejo, an urban village at the periphery of City of 
Pekalongan, was built upon three traditional lots of sawah (wet paddy field) in the mid-1980s. The 
factory needed to accumulate a substantial, albeit unprecedented, amount of land. For such purpose, it 
converted three adjacent paddy fields, creating a contiguous lot in a north–south direction. 
 
Paddy fields are typically intentionally flooded, because the crops need extensive watering. 
Mechanized irrigation was considered too expensive for traditional paddy farming practices, and as a 
result, paddy fields are typically laid on natural wetlands. Paddy is a very sensitive crop: Water levels 
should be set at a very precise point—not too high, and not too low. As a cheap solution to deal with 
the crop’s sensitivity, traditional farmers build short soil hillocks around their lots to minimize 
fluctuations in water levels. On these hillocks, they drill horizontal holes at a certain depth, creating a 
drain if extensive rain threatens the paddy’s water levels. When the water reaches threatening level, it 
is expected to run to neighboring field, which also uses this mechanism to drive water out, until it 
finally reaches the field’s lowest point and drains into the river. Because paddy fields are almost 
always located adjacent to each other, the hillocks then also function as a marker of “territories,” a 
traditional border of properties. An embanked paddy field is typically called a petak. This 
embankment technique, though, manages storm-water (and in this way, avoids its negative 
environmental effects) in a traditional and natural way. 
 
The Kismatex factory’s north-south orientation broke up the traditional water management system, 
where gravity carried water from higher altitudes in the west to the river in the east, instead retaining 
water at the factory’s longitudinal west side. Soil, which was moved to provide space for 
development, covered the two traditional drains farmers had built between their rice fields. One 
traditional drain was left untouched, but the factory’s heavy trucks eroded some parts of the drain, 
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making it impossible for water to flow through it. The heavy load overburdened the only remaining 
drain, which was adjacent to the factory wall. During the 1990s the area around the factory has 
become prime land, and some of the paddy fields were converted to housing, including the area west 
of the factory. Because the factory blocks the area’s natural drainage patterns, this area has 
experienced annual flooding during the rainy season. 
 
 
2. The Resolution: A Mediated Negotiation 
 
UPP Facilitators had trained BKM Yosorejo’s members for community-level planning. From the 
beginning, BKM realized that they needed to involve the factory to resolve the flooding problem. 
Creating an alternative drainage system circling the factory site would exhaust all of BKM’s very 
limited resources, which they received as UPP money from the national government.31 One solution 
proposed at a BKM meeting was to restore the three drains that had not been functioning since the 
factory started its operations. Since the drains were part of the factory’s property, BKM needed to 
approach the factory managers to persuade them to accept the idea. Feeling like they had less of a 
bargaining position, they sought patronage from the Lurah. This process led to a series of Lurah-
mediated negotiations between BKM and the factory. 
 
 
                                       
31 A typical neighborhood sewer drain would provide water clearance of 60 centimeters wide and 80 centimeters 
deep. To be reasonably durable, it needs to be built with concrete mix, and typically would cost Rp. 100,000 
(US$10) per meter. The drains span around 40 meters long, all three of them totaling into 117 meters of drains. 
Construction cost (excluding labor) would cost around Rp. 15 million (US$ 1,500). The total construction cost 
for the drain reached Rp. 54 million. (LPJ RWT Rejo Makmur, 31 March 2009). In this community of 
underemployed people, that amount of money was considered excessive. Yosorejo’s residents are typically 
working as on-call labors. They only work seasonally as kuli bangunan (construction workers), kuli panggul 
(manual lifters), or seasonal paddy harvesters (PJM Pronangkis Kelurahan Yosorejo 2007–2009). 
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Map 5: Yosorejo Situation Map. 
The lines with arrows show the three drain restored by BKM in 2008. The box shows the location of the 
Kelurahan’s office. BKM also uses this office for its daily operations. 
Source: BKM Yosorejo’s Internal Document 
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It took numerous meetings to reach a settlement. BKM’sfirst solution (to create a drain circling the 
factory’s site) was financially unfeasible: If the drain was built around the factory’s existing site, the 
factory would need to buy the surrounding land. The drain would also be much longer than it was 
necessary and this length would increase construction cost. The factory, after a significant amount of 
time, agreed to restore the drains that were earthed during the factory’s construction (BKM’s second 
solution).32  
 
The restored drain than would cross-sect the factory’s site. BKM saw this as a win-win solution that 
would solve the problem in a relatively inexpensive manner. BKM could not afford to buy the land or 
construction if the factory did not cooperate.  The factory’s willingness to dedicate a portion of their 
land in an urban setting for the project was seen as “generous enough,” so they could continue with 
the plan to restore the indigenous drains. When BKM and the factory reached a settlement, the 
Department of Public Work (Pekerjaan Umum, PU) agreed to allocate funding for construction of a 
road above the drain’s outlet next to the factory’s wall, significantly reducing the cost born by BKM. 
 
Lurah Satro Amijoyo’s personal relationship with the factory’s general manager, as he claimed, was a 
very helpful asset for him to negotiate with them. The factory manager was an ex military officer who 
turned to be a government official as the head of state-run traditional market. When he retired, he was 
appointed the factory’s general manager.33 Lurah Satro Amijoyo gave enough pressure to the factory 
in a very “soft” manner. He warned the factory general manager that local people could be very 
“shortsighted” and “narrow minded”, and when an aggressive collective action is held against the 
                                       
32 They reached settlement on 17 December 2008 (indicated by the Memorandum of Understanding). Both 
Lurah Satro Amijoyo and BKM members did not specify the time-span of this negotiation. They hastily recalled 
that it took more than necessary and that it involved frequent meeting. In the Javanese community, sense of time 
is not as accurate compared with Western society. Typically the true meaning of a time frame in verbal 
communication is longer than the pronounced one. When a local mentioned that an event occurred “yesterday,” 
it typically means that it happened in the relatively short past, possibly around less than a week or a month ago. 
When Lurah Satro Amijoyo and BKM members mentioned that this process took a long time, the time-span 
may be even longer than 6 months or one year. However, I am, of course, speculating. 
33 Lurah Satro Amijoyo correctly commented that it was really common for the New Order’s regime to give 
military officials privileges to assume civil public positions. 
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factory, they would not be able to bear the cost. Lurah Satro Amijoyo explained to me in a 
straightforward way: 
“This is a very uncertain period. Unemployment is high. Basic needs are overpriced. 
People can get shortsighted at times. Faced with problems they do not expect, like 
flooding, can make them lost their rationality. If they protested in a large mass to the 
factory, and it ended up as a violent event, it would be very unfortunate for all 
parties. If the factory was burnt for example, none of us win. Everybody loses. The 
factory lost their investment. Local people lost their jobs. I don’t want that to 
happen.”34 
 
To avoid aggressive action toward it, the factory offered to pay for all construction materials needed 
for the drain; BKM would only need to provide sweat equity for the construction process. 
 
Picture 3. Local residents constructing the drain outlet outside factory wall 
Picture 4. The drain inside the factory’s site 
Sources: BKM Rejo Makmur, Kelurahan Yosorejo’s internal documentation. 
 
 
3. Understanding Negotiation and Its Actors 
 
Who are the Advocates? Introduction to BKM Yosorejo 
 
BKM Yosorejo’s members are a very unique mix of people. Pak Noor Ali Mudlofar, coordinator of 
BKM, was an accounting staffer at a textile factory in the adjacent Batang regency. He considers the 
burden of the assignment to the BKM as “too heavy of a responsibility for a common person.” He 
quits his job to remain responsible for the assignment, though nobody else in the board made such a 
                                       
34 The number of impoverished households in the area rose from 391 in 2007 to 432 in 2008 (BKM Yosorejo, 
16 June 2009). Laid off workers from the factory account for this increase. Yosorejo has only 1,088 households, 
demonstrating how dependent local people are on the factory’s jobs. 
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decision. It was not an easy decision since he was also the breadwinner of his family, and made it 
only after his wife granted him permission.35 If one asks him why he made BKM his full-time “job,” 
he would answer, “I want the rest of my age to be meaningful for others. That’s what my religion 
taught me.” Another key figure is Bu Muji Lestari, a teaching superintendent of the City of 
Pekalongan. Both are very vocal and active in BKM’s management, decision-making processes, and 
advocacy efforts. Local people considered them the most “knowledgeable” people and possibly the 
ones with most authority: They often asked them if they were uncertain about a particular thing. 
 
Four other BKM members, who hold college degrees and professional employment, have 
sophisticated backgrounds like Pak Noor Ali Mudlofar and Bu Muji Lestari, but five members have 
far less sophisticated backgrounds. Pak Sugeng for example, is a seasonal labor worker. The five 
members are typically seasonal workers, local teachers, or entry-level government employees with a 
high school education. 
 
Hari, the neighborhood development facilitator for both Yosorejo and Podosugih, confirmed that 
Yosorejo’s BKM membership owns more “rootedness” on the place and its people, since they are 
elected from the smaller RT (neighborhood) basis, while BKM Podosugih’s members were elected 
from RW (community) basis.36 Consequently, there is also more diversity among BKM Yosorejo’s 
members, representing a wide range of socio-economic statuses and indicating that BKM is not an 
elitist group. Hari also confirmed that local residents typically know BKM members and are eager to 
get involved in BKM’s activities. During his service as a facilitator, he also observed that sometimes 
BKM is also involved in community activities, such as meetings at RT and RW, proving their good 
relationship is reciprocal. 
                                       
35 It is very uncommon for a paternalistic society to ask their wives to “grant permission.” They instead would 
use the term “consulting the wife.”  Ibu Rusiningrum, his wife, works at a local contracting company. It is 
possible that she supports the family after Pak Ali quit his job and serve as a full-time BKM coordinator. 
Otherwise, it would be difficult to imagine reversed power relations in his household. 
36 The UPP scheme only mandates that BKM elections be conducted from the basis level. The base may be 
either RT or RW, depending on the feasibility of the election at the respective locale. 
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Picture 5. BKM members showing the fixed drain’s outlet in front of the factory wall. 
Left to right: Khaula (local resident), Hari (project facilitator), Ali Mudlofar (BKM coordinator), and Hariyadi 
(BKM member) 
Source: Personal Documentation, July 2009 
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While BKM members are well known among kelurahan people, some focus group participants agreed 
that some concerns surround how they represent the people’s voice. Diningrum, a local facilitator, 
confirmed that Yosorejo’s capacity to involve local people in its activities is astronomical compared 
with the other 8 kelurahan where she has served. She confirmed that people’s participation in 
planning meetings is extensive. However, she also mentioned that people in Yosorejo are less critical 
and typically wait until their leaders take actions. That is, although they realize that there is an issue 
regarding their communities, they don’t speak freely in formal meetings unless a more influential 
person already opened a discussion regarding the issue. Therefore, even though BKM members 
always invite the public to BKM meetings or BKM members actively engage in community meetings, 
it does not mean that these meetings result in a tangible proposition of a project or resolve a real 
concern. Hence, even a participatory forum does not guarantee that people’s voices are transferred 
into BKM’s policies. 
 
Abovementioned phenomenon may explain why BKM members’ attempted to keep a neutral, if not 
artificially positive, attitude toward Kismatex during the negotiation process.37 Although some 
community members openly made the claim that Kismatex had contributed to the flooding, in several 
of my interviews, Pak Ali Mudlofar frequently rejected this preposition. According to him, the flood 
was a result of local peoples’ “bad habit[s].” He claimed that local people “do not have the conscience 
to keep the environment healthy” by collectively cleaning the drain periodically, so during the rainy 
season, water will not pass to lower land. Urged to answer how cleaning the drain would help water 
flow better, while the drain itself had been earthed, he said that it is still “local peoples’ responsibility 
to keep their environment safe and healthy, including bearing the burden of making necessary 
constructions to avoid flooding.” Bu Muji also confirmed Pak Ali’s claims, adding that the factory 
had been very generous with its proposition to let the drain cross-sect its property.  
                                       
37 I am asserting my subjectivity here. Given that my mother’s ancestors were from Java, I am fully aware of the 
local rhetoric. “Bad mouthing” about others is considered taboo, even until today, as urbanization changes  its 
society. Javanese people typically avoid direct confrontations. Their verbal communication is full of 
euphemisms. Conflicts are solved internally, and opening conflicts to the general public will bring the whole 
community into “a shame.” I was still considered as a stranger by my interviewees, and I expected people to 
speak more carefully about what happens internally. As a result, I consciously heightened my critical 
comprehension of what people actually said. 
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I tried another strategy—dealing with them in a more neutral way—to see if the BKM members’ 
responses changed. Asked why the only drain left could not let water flow, Pak Ali claimed that it 
was unintentionally earthed. Vehicles with heavy loads overburdened the red brick, stone, and mortar 
construction of the bridge over the drain’s outlet. In my observations, none of local residents owned 
heavy vehicles. Motorbikes are generally the most sophisticated means of private transport in the 
kelurahan. The only heavy loaders were container trucks owned by the factory. Pak Ali did not 
confront my observation, but also failed to admit the factory contributed to the flooding. He claimed 
that the bridge was located on a main road that is passed by people not only from the kelurahan, but 
also from neighboring areas. Therefore, the road is also burdened by frequent traffic. My field 
observation of the road conflicts with Pak Ali’s information. I found that the road he mentioned was a 
neighborhood driveway with relatively low traffic and did not see more than five motorbikes passing 
by in each hour of the day. 
 
Because Lurah Satro Amijoyo reported some of local residents had complained to the factory about 
the flooding, I expected either Pak Ali or Bu Muji to explain more about the social movement they 
led. They, however, remained neutral on their positions against the factory. To a certain extent, they 
exhibit deference to the factory and their responses seem to absolve it of responsibility for the 
flooding. 
 
Who Mediated the Conflict?  
 
Satro Amijoyo, the Lurah of Yosorejo for the past five years, is not a typical Indonesian administrator 
or bureaucrat at the sub-district level. He deals with local people with an egalitarian attitude, almost 
with no sense of bureaucracy. On a daily basis, Lurah Satro Amijoyo works relatively long hours (9–
5) compared with administrators at his level, who usually only work between 10–3. Accessing him is 
considerably easy: He never sits at his own office. Rather, he uses the Kelurahan’s function room as 
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his daily office, where he sits at a long table with the Carik (secretary of the office) and one other 
administrator.38 
 
In my observations, I witnessed how he dealt with one local person asking about his property tax 
memo, which he believed had been wrongly calculated—a task beyond the Lurah’s authority. His 
office distributes this type of notification, which it receives from another city bureau that specifically 
deals with taxes. Yet, the Lurah had to deal with these complaints every day. The person had come 
into the office three times, first to collect the notification, then to clarify a miscalculation, and then 
again in the same day to demand further explanation and file a complaint. In all occasions, Lurah 
Satro Amijoyo dealt with the person. During none of his three encounters did he refer the person to 
his staff. Once or twice, he asked his Carik for information on certain procedures, but most of the 
time, he patiently answered all questions himself. 
 
While his formal job-description as Lurah is administrative, Satro Amijoyo’s real responsibilities 
stretch beyond his formal mandate. His office helps people get citizenship documents, makes identity 
cards, and provides references for citizens to the bureaus issuing birth or death certificates and 
residency letters to other locales. Little of the office’s business is non-administrative jobs. However, 
the Lurah did mention that local people refer to him as local leader, which makes his position very 
difficult. He has to be ready to solve local conflicts, act as a mediator, or even deal with local legal 
disputes. Sometimes he even has to testify to police officers as the recognized authority of the area a 
crime, such as a theft and or local fight, occurs. These “additional assignments” are nowhere in his job 
description, but traditionally have burdened Lurahs everywhere in Java. 
  
Lurah Satro Amijoyo provided insight about how decentralization changed government operations at 
local level. For instance, when the central government under the New Order’s regime would call for 
                                       
38 The term kelurahan refers to the smallest administrative level of urban government in Indonesia. It applies to 
a geographically contiguous area with a population between 5,000 and 10,000 residents. In this paper, the term 
Kelurahan (with capital) refers to  a locale’s “government body”, while kelurahan refers to the administrative 
definition of the geography of the place. 
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school constructions (infamously known as Inpres [President’s Instruction]), their efforts largely 
failed to address the demand for school buildings in Pekalongan in general, because most local 
schools were privately owned by Islamic foundations and serve students from the traditional Moslem 
background. The centralized Inpres program lacked the knowledge on local demand and typically 
dedicated buildings for general, secular public schools. Hence in Pekalongan’s religious society, these 
buildings were usually left unused, and the schools almost never attracted enough students. Local 
students’ parents usually preferred to send their children to Madrasahs, where their children receive 
substantial amount of Islamic education in addition to the general education mandated by national 
curriculum.39  
 
Lurah Satro Amijoyo was well aware of political changes beyond his jurisdiction. He mentioned, in a 
favorable way, that under the “new mechanisms” local people are involved in the process of 
development by self-identification of local needs and beneficiaries, self-formulation of local 
solutions, and self-implementation of the proposed projects.40 He recognized that a larger force drives 
this trend, although he did not explicitly mention what or who played this role. He also was aware that 
the city (municipal) government had been trying to allocate a larger portion of its budget for locally 
planned and implemented projects. In Pekalongan, this type of dedication was called an 
“acceleration” fund.41 Lurah Satro Amijoyo also identified impediments to this process, including the 
requirement of DPR Daerah (DPRD)’s approval on municipal government’s budget provision.42 
Since DPRD members represent political parties, they may have differing political agendas from the 
                                       
39 Madrasah in Arabic literally means “school.” Typically categorized as Madrasah Tsanawiyah (elementary 
school), Ibtidaiyah (middle school), and Aliyah (high school), these institutions provide general education in 
science, language, physical education, and arts as mandated by a national curriculum, but with substantial 
religious education as well. In Java, Madrasahs usually operated by Muhammadiyah—an Islam-oriented civic 
association. A more traditional type of Islamic education is provided by Nahdlatul Ulama, another civic 
association, in the form of pesantren (Islamic boarding schools). The distinction between madrasah and 
pesantren is important, because madrasah provided Islam as an add-on to general education, while pesantren 
offers education with religion as its core. Jung (2008) provided a very thorough discussion on how 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama differ as civic organizations. 
40 He did not refer to the “new mechanism” as decentralization. To avoid bias in understanding, I also had 
avoided the term in further interviews with him and used terms he was comfortable with. 
41 Refer to the Acceleration Program explained in the previous subchapter. 
42 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR, House of Representatives) serves as the legislative branch of government in 
Indonesia. DPR Daerah (DPRD) is established to perform this legislative function at provincial, city 
(Kotamadya) and county (Kabupaten) levels. 
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municipal governments, and the process of budget allocation typically suffers from a long, time-
consuming negotiation between them. 
 
Illustrating Cooperative Measures: BKM–Kelurahan Alliance 
 
Since BKM Yosorejo’s establishment after the UPP began in Pekalongan, it has been the Kelurahan’s 
most important partner not only in poverty alleviation policymaking and implementation, but also in 
day to day operation. To illustrate this, Lurah Satro Amijoyo gave wide access to BKM members to 
the Kelurahan’s office. In my observations, BKM members and volunteers are indistinguishable from 
the Kelurahan’s staff, except they do not wear the civil servants’ khaki-colored uniform, working 
together on a daily basis with a strong sense of coordination and intense communication. To 
accommodate BKM members, Lurah Satro Amijoyo even gave his personal office to be the BKM’s 
filing and working room while he worked in the office’s lounge instead.43 Sometimes, Lurah Satro 
Amijoyo pays for BKM members’ drinks or food for internal meetings. His wife, the director of Bank 
Pasar in Pekalongan, has even provided free consultations for BKM’s financial planning. Lurah Satro 
Amijoyo explained his behavior toward BKM: He “pities them for working as volunteers with 
substantial burden as much as we (Kelurahan’s staff) who receive monetary compensation.” 
 
Lurah Satro Amijoyo understood the difficulties of dealing with “a complex mix of unsatisfied 
locales.” He illustrated how BKM members, who are unpaid volunteers, often received complaints 
from local people because they were not listed as a beneficiary of the UPP program. He implicitly 
asserted that locals should have thanked BKM members for working voluntarily, as he was grateful 
that some of the Kelurahan’s irregular work was redistributed among more people. 
 
                                       
43 My background as an architect informed these observations as well: The spatial configuration delivers strong 
meaning about how inclusive Lurah Satro Amijoyo is. I didn’t find this in any other of the Kelurahan. 
Typically, the Lurah assumes a strong sense of hierarchy and spatial configuration of the office represents this 
hierarchy. In most cases, the BKM office is located outside the Kelurahan’s office. 
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Lurah Satro Amijoyo frequently presented BKM as a great help to the Kelurahan, taking on tasks 
which the Kelurahan’s staff could not handle themselves. When Kelurahan Yosorejo was competing 
for the UPP grant, for example, the administrative requirements were extremely complicated; the 
Kelurahan’s staff has neither the capacity nor the time and energy to draft proposals, survey and 
identify beneficiaries, and implement projects. BKM members performed all these tasks instead. In 
the Lurah’s own words, “BKM Yosorejo had benefited from a ‘good mix of high resourced persons’ 
with excellent work ethics and relatively high soft skills to do all works abovementioned.”  
 
Because he believed BKM members’ need to meet some qualifications, Lurah Satro Amijoyo 
criticized the mechanisms to search for BKM members. He was skeptical about the democratic 
election process. Often, as he pointed out, the democratic election enabled people who are highly 
unqualified to fill positions. The UPP is a very complicated project with elaborate administrative 
requirements and an almost unrealistic time frame for its projects. He claimed that common people 
would not be able to understand the UPP’s typical report sheets and proposal forms. When a 
“unskilled” person is elected by the traditional community as BKM member, administrative problems 
he faces may jeopardize the project. 
 
Aside from administrative issues, according to the Lurah, democratic elections do not elect people 
with “honored intentions.” He pointed out that some elected BKM members assumed the position 
would benefit them financially. After experiencing the real work without payment, they quit the 
position. No one wanted to assume those positions, since word spread about how demanding the work 
was. He claimed that the BKM members that were left are the only ones with good intentions to serve 
the community.44 
 
 
                                       
44 The UPP emphasizes good human qualities in its program implementation; its technical program books 
emphasize honesty and altruism. In its constitution, the BKM election process explicitly prohibits self-
candidacy and campaign. Predictably, little, if any, interviews reveal any motivation of political “reward” of 
being a BKM member. 
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Delving into the Dynamics of Thoughts: Collateral Impact of Alliance? 
 
Regarding decentralization, the Lurah provided insight about the rights and responsibilities from local 
government to local people when asked how he perceived the difference between old and new 
mechanisms: 
“Usually, large projects, such as road construction and maintenance that required substantial 
amount of money, needed to wait for approval from municipal government since it would 
exhaust their resources. Nowadays, whenever local people felt that they could handle those 
projects themselves with local resources, they could just go for it. So everything can be done 
‘faster’ then previously.45 This is empowerment! People are empowered to solve their local 
problems with their own solutions, ideas, and resources.” 
 
This interview illustrated a larger asymmetry between a local constituency’s rights and 
responsibilities in Lurah Satro Amijoyo’s perception of “empowerment.” He visualized 
empowerment as “independence” from the ruling body, often coupled with a timely response to local 
problems. In this framework, however, independence is reached when localities gain the rights to 
decision-making and the responsibilities of taking on the burden of resource exhaustion. 
 
Lurah Satro Amijoyo hesitated to answer my next question, on whether under this “new mechanism,” 
the reverse may happen—that local constituents had larger access or at least more power to demand 
redistribution of resources that fit their interests. He turned defensive as he believed his conception of 
empowerment was superior to other practices. He also argued that local resources are scarce, directly 
confronting me by pointing that I come from the capital city of Indonesia and would not be able to 
appreciate how resources are managed to meet all interests. While budget allocation for typical 
empowerment programs for one kelurahan in Jakarta reaches hundreds of millions rupiahs, his 
kelurahan receives only a fraction of that.46 
 
                                       
45 This interview took place during the period of national presidential election. The word “faster” has implicit 
meaning since Jusuf Kalla, one presidential candidate used “the faster, the better” as his campaign gimmick. In a 
joking way, Lurah Satro Amijoyo illustrated how Golkar (Golongan Karya, the then–Vice President Jusuf 
Kalla’s political party as well as the main political machine of the New Order) was very influential in the area 
after the election of Mayor Basyir. Refer to the next case study for more comprehensive explanation on this. 
46 I corrected him, mentioning that in Jakarta each kelurahan receives one billion rupiahs annually for a similar 
program. Given that similar jurisdictions in Jakarta deal with more population, higher density, more complex 
urban problems and higher price index, I argued that this amount is relatively small. He, of course, disagreed. 
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Lurah Satro Amijoyo insisted that self-help for the supply of resources for development or poverty 
alleviation projects should accompany the privileges of self-determination in community decision-
making. According to him, not everybody in the community or a particular locale receives the 
benefits of poverty alleviation projects in the same way. Some people receive benefits more than 
others. Lurah Satro Amijoyo pointed out that while public facilities’ construction, such as roads and 
pathways, can benefit the whole community inclusively, some projects only benefits certain people, 
such as the house renovation projects using UPP money, which only benefit the homeowner. He 
highly scrutinized the practice of funding the whole house as an inappropriate way to free 
homeowners from poverty although he admitted that before the program was implemented some of 
them had “indecent housing and quality of life”. In these types of projects, he believed that individual 
homeowners should also contribute personal funds, and the UPP money should only serve as the 
stimulus to the project. Relatively, the proportion of this personal fund will be much higher than the 
proportion of community’s self-help funds used in road construction projects, which provides more 
inclusive benefits.47 
 
Mechanisms of resource collection also arose out from my conversations with Lurah Satro Amijoyo. 
In home renovation projects, it is much easier to determine how much the homeowner needs to 
contribute in a construction cost by asking him, whereas it is much more difficult to determine the 
costs for more “public” projects like road construction. Lurah Satro Amijoyo told me that local 
contributions do not always come in the form of money. The biggest contribution actually comes in 
labor and dedication of private land for public use. The cost to purchase all private lands that a 
planned road requires is generally equal to all construction materials. Without local people dedicating 
their private lands to the project, the construction is nearly impossible. 
 
To illustrate how difficult it was to collect partial contribution from community members, the Lurah 
told me an anecdote about the local village where road construction needed to take place: 
                                       
47 Though we differ in our perspectives on empowerment, I admire Lurah Satro Amijoyo’s elaborate conception 
of the balance between locals’ rights and responsibilities. 
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“The [planned] road stretched about 100 meters (330 feet). It was previously only pathways 
on soil. Villagers’ tolerance made it possible that people passing by other people’s lawns and 
front/backyards. Through time, people had figured out that the path was much shorter than 
the other road circling the village. We [kelurahan officers] came to the village sessions and 
threw the idea of paving the pathways to create [a] more permanent road. We let them know, 
that we only had this much [amount of money], while the land would cost us Rp. 350,000/m2, 
Rp. 35 million in total.48 We had no money to bear that burden, and suggested the villagers 
discuss how they could contribute to the road construction. Some villagers then agreed to just 
give away a portion of their land because it is only a strip on their property. Some others, 
because the road would take more of their land, wanted compensation, by which their 
neighbors would pay by collecting money among them.” 
 
When I asked Lurah Satro Amijoyo whether past experiences have shown that local villagers are 
reluctant or resistant to contributing for a public project, he expressed unease. Traditional Javanese 
people, according to him, are communal, and individualistic traits are unappreciated. Put another way, 
giving to the community’s urgent needs is highly regarded, and property ownership is not a popular 
theme. Asked about what would happen if a landowner decided not to give his or her land to the road 
construction project, he surprisingly answered that “the road construction would still go on without 
his dedication. When he sees that road has been constructed and it was cut on his personal land, he 
should’ve been ashamed, because his neighbors have dedicated land, while he had not.” This response 
illustrates how in traditional communities, the idea of community or public interest is superior to 
almost all private interests.  
 
Implicitly, Lurah Satro Amijoyo mentioned that personal commercial interest in publicly owned 
facilities is highly unpopular. That is why when landowners are faced with options to sell or to 
dedicate their land without compensation for road construction, they would prefer to dedicate it, 
because they would not want their neighbors to scrutinize them. Moreover, they do not want to create 
the image of “appropriating” the public’s interest by imposing financial burden on public projects. 
According to the Lurah, “He [the one who does not want to give away his land] did not realize the 
fact that he also passes by other villagers lands. They have given away their[s] as well.”  
 
Local decision-making is not always rosy. The sub-district administrator mentioned that in one 
project, the landowners were not that “generous” and were not willing to dedicate their land to the 
                                       
48 He did not specify how much money they already had allocated for the road construction. 
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public project. The village “committee” responsible for the project decided that the construction 
needed to keep going on, creating an incomplete road. Where landowners did not want to give away 
their land, the road was cut and left as unpaved soil pathways to exhibit that the land was not yet 
dedicated for the road project. As more and more people use the road and scrutinize the landowner, 
s/he would unwillingly give the land away. 
 
Surprisingly, BKM members shared so much of the Lurah’s thoughts. Once, our three-party 
discussion touched on who had primary responsibility for the flooding issue. Since Pak Ali claimed 
that the bridge above the drain was on a main road, I had asked him if local residents believed the city 
Department of Public Works was responsible for this issue. Pak Ali concluded “citizen[s] should be 
held responsible of what happened around their neighborhood;” therefore they need to “solve their 
own problems with their own resources.” One day, when Lurah Satro Amijoyo and I were walking 
down the street, we passed a local resident who lived in front of the drain outlet. During our 
interview, she said that while she had lived in the house for more than 40 years, the flooding never 
occurred before the factory was established. Lurah Satro Amijoyo pointed at the drain outlet, which 
was at the time covered by some household waste, and said, “[You] should also clean that. [People] 
should also have awareness that environmental health starts with environmental responsibility.” Pak 
Ali whispered to me confirming the Lurah’s words. 
 
Another interesting observation was how Pak Ali adopted the Lurah’s perception of “citizenship” and 
“benefactor’s rights.” In a short walk one afternoon, we reached the kelurahan’s bordering areas with 
paddy fields around them. I saw two shacks in the middle of the paddy fields. I asked Pak Ali if the 
two shack owners are also beneficiaries of the housing reconstruction projects. This was his answer: 
“We have a dilemma with those shack owners, or people living in [that] typical type of 
housing settlement. We could not really consider them as “our citizen[s].”49 They do not have 
any [legal form of] identification as proof of their residency here. Those shacks are of course 
impermanent and they are typically not building them on their own land. Giving them money 
is still fine. They are sometimes benefiting from charities that BKM organized. But we cannot 
really consider them as our beneficiaries [for the housing reconstruction program]. When we 
                                       
49 Pak Ali used the term warga, which literally means “people belonging to a group.” The phrase warga negara 
is used in official documents as a literal translation of “national citizen.” 
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are having home improvement projects, for example, they cannot be benefactors. If they build 
their shacks and it becomes more permanent, it is as if we legalize their presence, helping 
them to claim the property of their shacks and the land underneath them, and it will create 
problem[s] in the end.” 
 
Hari, a facilitator that the national government provided for the UPP project in the area added: 
“In fact, they may not belong to this place at all. They come from some different place to try 
their luck in this area, probably looking for seasonal jobs harvesting the paddy fields, and 
when the jobs are gone, they will probably be gone too.” 
 
 
4. A Thin, Fine Line between Strategic Alliance and Co-optation 
 
The case of Yosorejo illustrates how poverty and locals’ dependence on employment from the factory 
(and reciprocally, the factory’s dependence on cheap labor) played important roles in the “give and 
take” of negotiation. In this negotiation, the Lurah is not only acting as a mediator between the BKM, 
representing the local people’s interests, and the factory. The Lurah played a dualistic role, 
representing the interests of the state (in political order and stability), as well as representing the 
public’s interest (in the security of employment). The Lurah’s involvement pacified potentially 
aggressive collective action. 
 
While BKM struggled to advocate for local peoples’ interests, the Lurah influenced the negotiation 
process by shaping BKM members’ perceptions on citizenship. Chief among this process is a transfer 
of the administrative definition of citizens’ responsibilities and rights in development and poverty 
alleviation programs. The Lurah successfully diverted BKM members’ perceptions from poverty 
alleviation as a responsibility of the state to a social burden of community members and community 
governance. Consequently, this moderated their demands on the administrative government and 
pacified their potentially aggressive collective action. 
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This perception transfer is, however, possible only when BKM members are constantly exposed to the 
Kelurahan and the Lurah, who represent the administrative local government. To do this, Lurah 
needed to open both his agency’s physical and political space to BKM operation. BKM Yosorejo then 
benefitted from making the Kelurahan’s office their domicile. Shared space was then followed by 
stronger appropriation of Kelurahan’s resources to the BKM, and use of the Lurah’s personal and 
professional social networks to smoothen their negotiation processes. The price of this appropriation 
is that BKM is exposed to the official definition of citizenship and needs to operate within the 
framework of that definition. 
 
The case of Yosorejo demonstrates that CBOs engagement with the state in planning processes 
remains contested. While it represents a successful example of community’s appropriation of 
decentralization policy, it highlights the thin, fine line between a strategic alliance between the state 
and CBOs and the co-optation of civil society by the state. 
 
 
Chart 4. Framework of Yosorejo’s Advocacy 
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C. Political Hijack or Grassroots Activism? BKM Podosugih on Political Advocacy 
 
 
 
1. Podosugih as a Context 
  
Podosugih is a kelurahan with the most urban setting in the City of Pekalongan. Sudirman, Urip 
Sumoharjo and Hayam Wuruk streets divide the Kelurahan into four unequal quadrants. The 
Ponolawen intersection, where the three arteries meet, is considered the heart of Pekalongan. It has 
the busiest traffic all over the city, because Sudirman Street serves interprovincial traffic that bypasses 
Pekalongan from the Northwest to the East, while Urip Sumoharjo and Hayam Wuruk connect the 
area with Kajen, the regional center of batik textile industry. It is where the mayor’s office, city 
planning agency, local parliament, and other governmental offices are located. It is also the place of 
Sri Ratu Mega Center, the city’s first modern indoor mall, and a traditional bird and bicycle market. 
Its land use has transformed into mostly residential from the original agricultural uses. Through 
decades of acquisition, most of remaining agricultural lots no longer operated by traditional farmers 
with individual ownership. The open lots are typically owned by corporations or businessmen with 
large capital and will soon be converted into residential buildings. RW (communities) 8 and 9 recently 
have been completely transformed into a modern real estate development. 
 
Most of Podosugih’s poor households are identified by their low monthly incomes, typically lower 
than the regional minimum wage regulation even after income of all family members is aggregated.50 
Through annual surveys, BKM Podosugih identified at least 700 out of around 2,000 households fell 
into this category. This relatively high figure was a result of the high number of lay off because of the 
economic crisis at the end of 2008. The number was slightly lower than when BKM was first 
established after the 1997 monetary crisis. In Podosugih’s case, most of laid-off workers found that 
being highly skilled was a disadvantage. First, most workers were only trained to work in one 
particular type of industry, in Pekalongan’s case, the textile industry. Sufficient growth in other 
                                       
50 Regional minimum wage (UMR) for Pekalongan is Rp. 615,000 (US$ 62) per month as of 2008 (Badan 
Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Indonesia, 
http://regionalinvestment.com/sipid/id/ekonomiumrd.php?ia=3375&is=45) 
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industries did not follow the textile industry’s rapid decline and the remaining industries preferred 
labor with less experience, which they could pay a lower wage. Second, the newly unemployed 
people could not easily turn to traditional farming, like people from other kelurahan, because of the 
unavailability of land. Finally, a small number of the workers could not reenter the work force 
because of their old age and worsening health condition. Additionally, health suffered in the wake of 
these layoffs: Focus group discussions revealed that when income levels fall, families would first de-
prioritize health care. Hence, the low service in health care and the fall of income are two self-
perpetuating phenomenon following the decline of Pekalongan’s industries.  
 
 
2. Podosugih: From Community Self-Help to Advocacy Network 
 
Some Notes on Podosugih’s Achievements 
 
BKM Podosugih’s main achievement is its efforts that went beyond its geographic boundary and its 
beneficiaries’ scope of interest. BKM Podosugih was actively involved in advocating for legislation 
that gives more flexibility to community-self help institutions operations in poverty alleviation efforts. 
As a result of its advocacy, the city adopted UPP as the city’s poverty alleviation program, and 
promised to use a community-based development model as the main platform for all poverty 
alleviation programs within the city.51 Consequently, the city would provide resources to establish and 
operate a BKM organization in all kelurahan in the City of Pekalongan. The city had helped to 
establish BKM in another 17 kelurahan that did not receive UPP grants from the central government. 
In 2010, at the time this thesis was written, all 46 kelurahan in Pekalongan already had a BKM. The 
city allocated Rp. 7.2 billion (US$720,000) to supplement the Rp. 9.2 billion from the UPP grant 
allocated by national government to all kelurahan in Pekalongan. The city distributed the funds 
                                       
51 UPP was previously a national government’s program under Departemen Pekerjaan Umum (Ministry of 
Public Works). 
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evenly so every kelurahan would receive Rp. 150 million (US$15,000), in addition to the Rp. 200 
million (US$20,000) granted by national government as BKM’s initial capital. 
 
 
Map 6. Podosugih’s Existing Conditions as Identified by Community Meetings 
Source: BKM Podosugih’s Neighborhood Development Internal Document 
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Capitalizing on this major achievement, BKM Podosugih developed more sophisticated objectives 
other than just demanding budget allocations from the government for its operations. BKM planned to 
demand the city government to manage some strategic programs, such as provisions for clean water 
and training for underemployed laborers. Even more sophisticated, in some meetings, they started to 
raise awareness about the environment. Their short-term priorities included resolving the flooding 
problem created by Sri Ratu Mega Center. Their long-term priorities included improvement of water 
quality of the river that passes by the kelurahan and improvement of the artery road on the riverbank.  
 
There have also been conversations in community meetings about developing the riverbank into a 
local tourist attraction to provide revenue for the community. To support this, BKM planned to 
advocate for a more environmentally friendly textile industry operation, especially those located on 
the upper course of the riverbank. This would be possible if they pressured the city government to 
regulate textile industries in kelurahan located at the river’s upper course. They also planned to 
advocate for more public space. The only dedicated public space is Mataram Square, which is 
associated with the government’s office complex. BKM’s newest agenda seeks to reroute traffic 
throughout the city. Most residents felt that industrial vehicles passing by Sudirman and Hayam 
Wuruk streets create air pollution, noise, and ground vibrations that building structures cannot handle. 
 
 
Pak Anton’s Story: From Community Organizer to City Legislator 
 
BKM Podosugih’s coordinator is Sudjaka Martana (Pak Anton), a soft-spoken figure whom I met  on 
a series of occasions. As the coordinator of a successful BKM, Pak Anton had been personally invited 
to many formal functions, as well as hosting and speaking on comparative study sessions held by 
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other BKMs.52 He was more articulate than any other BKM coordinators or members I met, possibly 
because of his public speaking experience. He started his community service in 1989 as an aide for his 
area’s neighborhood association for five years and community association for another nine years.53 
Almost 50 years old when he was elected as the BKM coordinator for kelurahan Podosugih, he had 
just started a managerial position at Astana, a then–three-star hotel in Pekalongan.54 He described the 
election as “psychologically troubling.” Being a BKM coordinator was considerably overburdening; it 
requires a  full-time commitment, while the position offers no monetary compensation. At the same 
time, he was the breadwinner of his family.55 To illustrate the situation, he told me: 
“I was elected [as coordinator of BKM] in 1999. I became severely ill and got 
hospitalized for four months in 2000 [because of the overburden of work]. I went 
back to Ngawi, my home village [to contemplate].56 After two months, I came back to 
this place and decided to resign from my [paid] job. It wasn’t a decision that anybody 
would make. It was daring. Back then I had already earned Rp. 2,000,000 [per 
month] while I knew in this job I wouldn’t get paid.” 
 
Pak Anton described his decision to serve as BKM coordinator as completely altruistic. In a series of 
conversations, he mentioned frequently about his “personal call to serve the poor and the old.” He 
also frequently mentioned that not everybody gains the same trust that he and other BKM members 
had gained. Many people already trusted him, which made it difficult to reject the position.  This 
statement, on the other hand, illustrates the typical social pressure in a semi-traditional Javanese 
society. Though Pak Anton received no monetary compensation for his position, he looked at it with a 
sense of pride. To him, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Aburizal Bakrie’s visit—BKM 
                                       
52 He is either invited to or hosting other BKMs. Some of these BKMs coming to Podosugih were from the same 
region, but most of them were from Indonesian islands of Sumatera and Sulawesi. Pak Anton jokingly told me 
that most of them were suspiciously intended to just travel as a tourist. 
53 Neighborhood Association (Rukun Tetangga, RT) consists of around 40 households. A Community 
Association (Rukun Warga, RW) consists of around 15 RT. Both RT and RW are informal structures of the 
community government in Indonesia. Services as aides are voluntary for a specified period. 
54 In old Sanskrit, the word astana means “palace”. The three star hotel scales understates its importance and 
prestige among the locale’s perception. Its parent company had several very successful business operations 
including gas stations and some interprovincial buses, by which Pak Anton managed. 
55 He later on told me that his eldest son worked as a UPP economic facilitator in another city. He shares his 
house with his son and daughter in-law. It is pretty common for Javanese families to take care of elder relatives. 
This clarifies how he could maintain his household without earning any income as a BKM coordinator. 
56 Reading this text literally will not give that much of a sense. A reader has to delve through the spiritual notion 
of “revisiting the original purpose of creation” for traditional Javanese people to understand how he finally 
made such decision just by “going back to the home village”. 
 
 
81 
Podosugih was granted the Award for Best Practice in Community Organizations at the provincial and 
national levels—was part of the reward for his service.57 
 
Though many referred to him as “the brain behind BKM Podosugih’s achievements,” in our four 
interviews, he seldom emphasized his importance; he told his stories in simple narratives without 
exaggeration. Asked about whether Podosugih’s urban setting influences its poverty, he answered 
shortly that “our poor have jobs with irregular income, and the period of not receiving income is 
usually longer than the productive one.” Asked about the challenges of managing the microcredit 
revolving fund that was supposed to support micro-businesses, he answered: “when you need to eat, 
you don’t ask whether this money is a [business] loan or a cHeryty.” I asked him to describe how the 
community makes decisions about large projects like paving 250 square meter road behind the 
kelurahan in 2002. He told me that he was just “sitting with some other neighbors when somebody 
mentioned that to go to the mosque they had to walk through muddy pathways.” Asked about how the 
community could collect enough resources to do such exhaustive project, he explained that to 
complement the small amount of money the government gave them, “men put the bricks, women 
carried them [for the men], and teenagers did whatever they could.” 
 
In all four interviews, Pak Anton affirmed his inclination toward inclusive and democratic 
participation, both in the BKM’s decision-making processes and the relationship between BKM and 
its beneficiaries. He claimed that other members were as engaged as he was, but he contended that 
most members do not have “the necessary valor to exercise their discretion.” He admitted that in 
Javanese society, a paternalistic figure like him is still considered important in decision-making 
processes, and other members felt “unease when they had to make an important decision.” Asked if 
                                       
57 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, often abbreviated as SBY, has been Indonesian president since 2004.  Aburizal 
Bakrie was Chief Minister of Social Welfare in the 2004-2009 cabinet. Podosugih won the provincial title in 
2001 and the national title in 2005. 
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other members could conduct meetings or make decisions without his presence, he answered “yes, but 
they wait until I could have my say and they usually would dutifully defer to my judgments.”58 
 
In relation to beneficiaries, Pak Anton frequently emphasized that beneficiaries had the right of access 
to information because, “information is prerequisite to comprehension, and comprehension leads to 
participation.” He contended how most of BKM members felt that beneficiaries need to “earn” 
information by coming to BKM’s informative meetings. Most of beneficiaries are not just poor, but 
also less educated compared with the rest of the population, and typically are not interested in formal 
meetings. Therefore to guarantee beneficiaries’ rights to know about BKM’s projects, the BKM relied 
heavily on informal communication using existing social networks. To explain the microcredit 
scheme, volunteers literally had to go door-to-door, making one-on-one conversation with potential 
beneficiaries in language they could understand. This would not be able to be done if BKM members 
had transformed into new “elites” with assumption of authority as elected officials. Elitism and 
emerging fondness to bureaucratic culture (which will make it difficult for informal communication 
methods) were, as he contended, not uncommon phenomena in other BKM’s operations. 
 
Pak Anton’s personal philosophy governed BKM Podosugih’s operations. He mentioned several 
times that BKM is not a “solve-it-all” organization, and each individual beneficiary of BKM projects 
must ascribe to self-help as a philosophy. According to him, BKM’s achievements are the result of its 
ability to involve all layers of the community in almost all of their projects, so that every single 
individual beneficiary “earns” those achievements. For example, during house reconstruction projects, 
once a household is identified as an eligible beneficiary of BKM’s projects, BKM would offer a soft 
loan for housing reconstruction, which would partially cover some elements of the house (e.g., for 
                                       
58 Contradictory to his claim, a project facilitator and a BKM member who would speak in condition of 
anonymity clarified that there is a major disincentive for other members to make decision without their 
coordinator. According to the facilitator, Pak Anton did not always permit a meeting without his presence, and 
sometimes he deliberately overruled the decisions of those meetings. The night before I interviewed him 6 of 11 
BKM members gathered for a meeting and they voluntarily dismissed after knowing that he was not present. 
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flooring or roofing) but not the cost of labor.59 Typically, creditors use their own labor to do the 
construction. “This is in accordance with the spirit of self-help,” Pak Anton told me. In another 
interview session he said that, “people are responsible of their own problems and solutions. BKM can 
only provide them with some stimulus.” On another occasion, he mentioned how “BKM members 
could save so much time, energy, and resources by transferring some responsibilities to beneficiaries.” 
 
In 2008, Pak Anton was elected as a member of DPRD Pekalongan, which he credited as a result of 
his extensive engagement in BKM’s projects.60 The candidacy process was not initiated by him, but 
by a group of beneficiaries. They, he claimed, expected him to bring more concrete changes to 
government projects. The beneficiaries also ran a militant campaign through word-of-mouth and 
door-to-door visits to explain his platforms for inclusive and democratic government. Pak Anton 
confessed that none of the platforms were really groundbreaking. Almost all of them were actually 
lessons from managing the BKM, which Pak Anton believed were ideal to for being a parliament 
member. 
 
What does It Take to Lead a Community Self-Help Institution? 
 
A general consensus exists among local UPP facilitators and BKM members that BKM Podosugih’s 
operations are dependent on Pak Anton’s leadership.61 By extension, though, a potential problem of 
leadership transmission then emerges. A verbal history shared by BKM members and facilitators 
confirmed that Pak Anton is one of two BKM members who has been reelected every three years 
since BKM’s first establishment. The other one is Ahmad Nuh, the Lurah of Kramatsari subdistrict 
                                       
59 BKM Podosugih competed for and eventually received a Rp. 500,000,000 (around US$50,000) grant from 
Ministry of Housing in 2005. This grant was used as a revolving loan for housing construction with 6% annual 
interest. This is relatively much more affordable compared to other governmental source of funding such as one 
that was provided by Housing Bureau of Central Java Province with 15% annual interest. As of June 2009, 
BKM Podosugih had channelled this loan to almost 400 households. 
60 Indonesia has an enormously immense system for political representation with the presence of DPRD at 
provincial, regency and city level. Pak Anton was elected as a member of the city DPRD. 
61 FGD participants disagreed with this claim. They thought Pak Anton was considerably resourceful at external 
networking and negotiations, but other BKM members already effectively perform BKM’s daily operations and 
internal relationships with beneficiaries.  
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who lives in Podosugih. Four of the 9 members elected in 1999 and 2002 withdrew from their 
positions because of the workload. After the 2005 election, 4 of the elected 13 members withdrew 
within their first 4 weeks of service. Now they have 9 active members as a result of the 2007 election. 
Most of interview and focus group discussion participants confirmed that they kept electing Pak 
Anton because they thought he would not resign from his post so that the services BKM provided 
would not be jeopardized. 
 
Pak Anton himself is concerned about who will assume leadership after him, but he has prepared 
three young “cadres” to anticipate it. However, he realized that there were at least three potential 
problems with his cadres. First, he was not sure of their intrinsic interests to assume leadership.62 Pak 
Anton’s other concern was about the professional capacity of the candidates. He insisted that besides 
honesty, a BKM coordinator must also be a visionary leader to keep BKM’s operations sustainable. 
This necessary “vision to the future” would not be easily supplemented by collective leadership, like 
in other kelurahan.63 He claimed that even though other members were formally able to exercise their 
discretion through collective leadership, most of them have not been able to develop social, 
professional, and governmental networks as he had.64 Most importantly, he emphasized that it took 
more than just a natural leader to assume this responsibility; it also took a notion of rootedness within 
the community.65 Being rooted in the community in particular is not related to a lack of individual 
capacity, but rather persistence. He explained that most approaches to governmental organizations 
“require you to never complain or feel tired,” which is also true when dealing with beneficiaries and 
other community members. He claimed that he was often “sitting with five to ten people, sometimes 
housewives as well,” just to talk to them without the intention of offering BKM’s microcredit or 
                                       
62 He mentioned about one BKM member who is very articulate but is not “administratively correct” in terms of 
accounting principles. I would speculate that this is part of Pak Anton’s euphemism. The term is archaically 
used by Javanese to refer to someone who prone to behave in a fraudulent way. 
63 He mentioned about BKM in kelurahan Panjang Wetan as a negative example where the whole Rp 500 
million of UPP grant was completely spent for physical infrastructure. That BKM now has no budget to sustain 
operation although no fraud was detected and most BKM members and volunteers were considered trustworthy. 
64 He mentioned other BKM member who was well known for his trustworthiness but has no necessary 
articulateness to professionally negotiate settlements or persuade other people to claim leadership. 
65 He shortly told me a story of other BKM member who had been a very good administrator and program 
manager, but his accidental self-righteousness makes him not very well accepted by the community as well as 
other BKM members. 
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asking them to participate in their projects. The intention of those visits were solely “for them to get 
to know me,” as he put it. 
 
FGD participants openly shared their strategies to prepare the three candidates, mainly by 
apprenticeship. Some members mentioned how Pak Anton brings at least one of the three candidates 
with him to governmental meetings so they can “get themselves a proper introduction” and “learn 
how to deal with their governmental counterpart.” However, the succession process poses difficulties, 
mainly because apprenticeship-style training is impractical. All of the three candidates have their own 
full-time commitments. While Pak Anton withdrew from all of BKM’s managerial functions  to give 
more opportunities for leadership to other BKM members,  he admits that he still plays a large role in 
planning and implementation processes through “supervision and control” functions. Another barrier 
to transferring leadership is that people can vote for a completely new member, who is unfamiliar 
with the BKM organization and the necessary traits to lead it. 
 
Most FGD members agreed that “necessary knowledge” constitutes an understanding of local poverty 
and “necessary traits” constitute the ability to persuade community members and mobilize them into a 
collective action. Stephen, the professional urban planner hired by BKM to help with infrastructure 
planning, confirmed that the community’s potential to advocate for themselves have been developed 
through a series of community meetings. This capacity was observable from the rise of community 
members’ awareness to some equity issues, especially the underdevelopment of physical 
infrastructure in their area. However, when the time comes to take action, not all community leaders 
are assertive enough to generate collective action, or advocate at the government level.66 Most social 
mobilization solely sought project completion, such as road construction, and no political pressure 
was exerted on the government to address long-term concerns. Community members’ reluctance to 
join collective actions was not merely because of community leaders and BKM members’ incapacity, 
but also the reminiscent of long-term conditioning by the New Order governance. Most citizens were 
                                       
66 By “collective action,” I do not refer to community members’ participation in  the implementation of 
community projects, such as road construction, but also to a larger process of determining the community’s 
needs and wants and involvement in mass movements to pressure the government. 
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skeptical that collective action would result in a tangible resolution to their problems, because 
governmental programs preceding the UPP were falsely participatory.67 
 
On Interest, Representation, Participation and Conflict Resolution 
 
As an urban place, Podosugih is not very cohesive. Stephen claimed that of all nine RW 
(communities), only RW VII and RW II consistently responded to BKM’s calls. This did not 
necessarily mean that other communities are nonresponsive. RW VII and RW II, however, had the 
capacity to involve more community members, including youth. Other communities, as he claimed, 
only involved a limited portion of their members in BKM activities. A focus group participant said 
that it was very difficult to involve people from some communities in BKM’s meetings and 
community projects, because some community members still expected monetary compensation for 
their involvement. 
 
Most focus group participants agreed that representation would not hinder people’s participation in 
decision-making, because BKM invites most attendees of community meetings to vote on their 
decisions. However, some focus group participants agreed that there is equity problem associated with 
underrepresentation of a particular group. RW VII, for example, referred by FGD participants as the 
oldest and most impoverished community in Podosugih, has no representatives in the membership of 
BKM. Despite its urban location, RW VII is a group of closely related people. Their land is typically 
traditionally divided into parcels through a long process between heirs, the owners are usually related, 
the parcel divisions are subtle, and lots are typically not clearly demarcated. Therefore, circulation 
typically is not “built,” but rather “happen” in between buildings. As a result of the unplanned built 
environment, none of the houses have internal toilets, causing sanitary problems. In most political 
systems, people in poverty often have little capacity to influence others. Hence, people from RW VII 
                                       
67 Baswari, a senior UPP facilitator, disagreed. He claimed that the trading community makes a substantial 
portion of Pekalongan’s middle-class population: They are already intrinsically indifferent to political and social 
movements hence difficult to mobilize. In his own words: “they are the pa’ora sa’pore (ultimately up to you) 
population.” He claimed that this is unique to Pekalongan, even if compared to other Javanese cities. Other local 
facilitators confirmed this cultural attribute. 
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would not be able to have a very strong voice in meetings held outside their community, like a larger 
kelurahan meeting. Some facilitators agreed their voice would be better represented if one of their 
community members became a BKM member. 
 
Although most of interview and FGD participants agreed that BKM members represent beneficiaries’ 
interests well, this relationship is not without conflict. Disagreement often occurs when BKM do not 
grant microloans to some people not identified an as eligible beneficiary. In physical infrastructure 
development projects, due to the limited financial resources, BKM frequently prioritized one project 
over the other. Beneficiaries whose house was not categorized as an eligible recipient of a housing 
reconstruction subsidy, or a collective whose neighborhood was not an eligible recipient of road 
paving or gutter-improvement subsidies is usually disappointed.  
 
BKM Podosugih considers heavily the proportion of beneficiaries’ contribution for the project to 
determine priorities. Although no interview participants mentioned this as a source of conflict, it 
potentially leads to equity issues because typically communities with less resource cannot contribute 
as much as the more affluent ones.68 Sometimes, community members must contribute to projects that 
do not yield direct benefits to their communities. For instance, the construction of BKM’s office was 
partly funded by a mass contribution of building materials.69 
 
Debt collection is another source of interpersonal conflict between BKM members and beneficiaries. 
To reduce this problem, BKM Podosugih introduced banking practices to all of its debtors. Because 
debt collection was conducted through bank deposits, BKM members do not have to deal with 
                                       
68 Pak S Basir, the BKM secretary, mentioned that beneficiaries’ contribution is actually the only consideration. 
To illustrate this, a road-paving project worth Rp. 8 million (US$ 800) was to be subsidized by BKM with Rp. 3 
million of beneficiaries’ contribution. The 90 households of potential beneficiaries would then collect Rp. 100 
per day per household to fulfill the contribution requirement. 
69 Community members and surrounding retail stores donate bricks, cements, and pit sand for construction, 
worth Rp. 12,500,000 accounting almost half of the whole construction cost while BKM paid for the labor. As 
of 2001, the total construction cost was Rp. 25,670,000 (US$2,567). 
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delinquency of debtors themselves.70 So far, however, all emerging conflicts were considered easy to 
resolve. 
 
Who Should Conduct the Orchestra? A Note on Self-Direction 
 
A general tension exists between BKM members and UPP facilitators. Some BKM members felt that 
UPP facilitators have less sense of belonging to the places they serve. Some facilitators do not live in 
the area, commuting daily from another city within 1 to 2.5 hour of travel by motorcycle, the most 
common mode of transport, while other live at UPP’s base camp.71 Pak Anton openly expressed his 
concern that some facilitators would leave the locale they serve on weekends to visit their families in 
other cities. Meanwhile, the most vibrant community activities usually occur on weekends when 
facilitators are absent. Mayor Basyir once asserted that UPP facilitators were supposed to work three 
times harder than normal people in Pekalongan (while they were not), because they were paid three 
times higher.72 Another BKM member mentioned that some facilitators were promoted because BKM 
Podosugih was so successful, while BKM members were the ones who really worked for it. 
 
Most facilitators would not confirm if they were underworked; however they confirmed that BKM 
members were more advanced than them in terms of negotiating with the government. UPP 
facilitators helped BKM members at RT- (neighborhood) and RW- (community) levels, while the city 
coordinator of facilitators  helped bridge UPP’s interest with government’s institution. However, 
through Pak Anton and Pak Basyir’s governmental positions, BKM has more access to government 
officials compared with facilitators. 
 
                                       
70 Three BKM members’ approval was necessary for each microloan. Debtors are given option to cash a check 
or deposit it in a new bank account in any of the three local banks, BNI, BRI and Bank Pasar. Pak Anton once 
asserted that involving banks was also a “fraud prevention” mechanism. 
71 It is a quite common practice in small cities like Kendal and Pekalongan to rent a house as an office, because 
of the limited options of “formal” office buildings available. UPP consultant for Pekalongan also did this. 
72 Facilitators are paid at relatively higher national rate and are. They are typically compensated between Rp. 2.5 
million and 3.5 million (US$ 250–350) per month, almost four times the minimum wage for Pekalongan (Rp. 
700,000 (US$ 70) per month as of July 2009). 
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An even more significant issue is who has more stakes in the plan. In some of the interviews when our 
discussion touched on “insider-outsider” issues within the planning process, some sparks occurred. 
Stephen told me that UPP’s infrastructure development program was a “half bottom-up and half top-
down:” Essentially it served the government’s dual mission of infrastructure development and direct 
participation of beneficiaries, and facilitators often fell in the middle of the negotiation process 
between the two interests. BKM members seemed not to be persuaded with this dualistic approach. 
Pak Anton told me in a straightforward way, “[UPP] facilitators will leave our kelurahan at one point, 
and when that happens, we need to be able to organize ourselves [without them]. It is our plan, and it 
is supposed to be our plan, not theirs.” In another session, he firmly stated: “when facilitators come to 
our place, they [need to] work our way.” Another BKM member who only spoke on the condition of 
anonymity told me that any plan produced by BKM must “reflect what the community really needs 
instead of representing what facilitators felt is needed.” 
 
Self-direction is not only visible in the relationship between BKM and facilitators, but is in their 
relationship with their governmental counterpart. In 2000, some BKM members from Central Java 
were invited by the DPRD to discuss UPP implementation. That meeting turned was instructive 
instead of dialogical. DPRD members expected BKM members to allocate Rp. 50 million of their 
money for infrastructure development in their area.73 BKM Podosugih openly resisted these 
instructions, contending that in its particular area—an urban setting—more road construction or gutter 
improvements were not what its community needed. Because most of beneficiaries in their 
community are typically part-time and/or seasonal labors, they really needed more low-interest 
microloans as additional working capital.74 
 
                                       
73 The first grant given to BKM in 1999 was Rp. 250 million (US$ 25,000). The DPRD has played an important 
role in local budgeting, including these types of grants. This instruction was to satisfy local constituents. 
Infrastructure development had been an easy strategy to demonstrate that governmental programs really worked. 
74 A perfect example of this is a textile labor, working at the factory during the day and tailoring for neighbors at 
night. She benefit from BKM’s microloans by being able to own a capital asset (sewing machine) from BKM’s 
revolving fund. 
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In an open statement the DPRD doubted that, with a lack of BKM members’ experience in managing 
microcredit schemes, the loans would be returned. DPRD members were also skeptical that the 
revolving fund would be channeled to the appropriate beneficiaries, because the official statistics did 
not represent Podosugih as a poor kelurahan. Aside from those concerns, BKM was also suspected of 
fraud. The dedicated budget allocation for physical infrastructure was meant to be a “safety net,” 
where at least some of the money would fund “real projects.” 
 
BKM members argued that their annual poverty survey was much more accurate than the 
government’s census, because their volunteer surveyors were locals with knowledge on local poverty 
and beneficiaries. BKM also convinced the DPRD that they had more sophisticated administration of 
microcredit schemes by using local banks as an intermediary between BKM and debtors. Pressured by 
the DPRD members, BKM, after a long negotiation, finally agreed to allocate 20 percent of its grant 
for infrastructure development only after they provided microloans for three years. The grant was 
treated as a revolving fund, and BKM could retain its full amount after the three-year period. 
 
 
3. Where Should We Stand? Strategically Deciding When to Be an Insider 
 
BKM Podosugih’s relationship with government agents was not always adversarial, but rather 
strategically determined. In 1999, the first platform of the UPP was to separate BKM’s administration 
completely from the Kelurahan. The national consultant specifically mandated BKMs to be 
governmental counterparts instead of sub-administrations of the Kelurahan. This separation was 
necessary, because the Kelurahan was often seen as a very ineffective and corrupt branch of local 
government. BKM Podosugih openly confronted this policy.75 Their rationale was that its BKM was a 
newly established organization. Without a recognizable person, they would have difficulty 
approaching citizens and gaining beneficiaries’ trust. In the first three years, the BKM invited the 
                                       
75 In Pak Anton’s words “kami lawan peraturan itu” (we fought that policy). This is a very strong statement for 
a very euphemistic Javanese man. Their statements are typically less straightforward. 
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Lurah to every internal meeting and informational meeting with beneficiaries. Lurah and BKM 
members also worked very closely in the BKM’s daily operations. 
 
The close relationship between the BKM and the Lurah did not necessarily mean that the Lurah had 
an influence in its decision-making processes. More than one BKM member confirmed that the 
Lurah’s presence at BKM events was merely ceremonial, although they needed him to create a more 
legitimate perception of the BKM with the Javanese traditional-paternalistic audience. BKM 
members, however, did not consider the Lurah as a paternalistic role model they needed for decision-
making.76 Most BKM members consider Pak Anton as the person to fill that role. Pak Parto, the 
current Lurah, did not explicitly confirm to this, but whenever I asked his views on BKM policies, he 
would indirectly admit that he was not fully informed and did not have discretion to make decisions in 
BKM’s bi-monthly meeting. He, however, claimed that he “shared all the positive values that BKM 
had brought to the community and he was proud to have a high achieving BKM.” 
 
From my observations, I concluded that, to BKM members, the position of Lurah had actually been 
degraded a bit. S Basir, the secretary of BKM Podosugih, apparently was the former Lurah of 
Podosugih. On occasions, I saw Pak Anton giving instructions to Pak S Basir, and he dutifully 
complied. Instruction and compliance were performed with mutual respect, but hierarchical order was 
still clearly visible. While under general circumstances this exchange seems very natural since Pak S 
Basir is a paid employee of the BKM, in a semi-traditional Javanese society where social position and 
hierarchy remained unchanged for a long time, it seems extraordinary. 77 A former Lurah, Pak S Basir, 
a public official of 14 years, would earn very high respect, especially from younger generations.78  
Pak S Basir’s response to a general public’s inquiry, for example, was much more dignified compared 
to his response to a BKM member. 
                                       
76 Stephen challenge the claim that the paternalistic culture had shifted into more egalitarian one. He mentioned 
that some BKM members actually “report” to Lurah Parto. 
77 Pak S Basir rejected the idea that he was a paid employee. He considered his job as a voluntary service. He 
was compensated Rp. 100,000 (US$10) / month. He proudly said that the amount wouldn’t even enough to 
reimburse his transportation cost, moreover to honor his service.  
78 Pak S Basir had served as a Lurah since 1987 before he retired in 2001. He was 67 at the time of the 
interview. Prior to being a Lurah he was an employee at Pekalongan’s Chamber of Commerce. 
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Most BKM members agreed that personal relationships with government officials helped 
negotiations. Facilitators usually dealt with government bureaus with formal approaches, while BKM 
members could deal with individual officials through informal channels.79 Most negotiations—and 
deals—happened in informal meetings. However, some members also contended that this informal 
method only worked with some officials and could not be replicated by others. It depended on 
individual relations and could not be institutionalized in any way. 
 
Between 2001 and 2005, BKM Podosugih shifted their position to be more politically active. Driven 
by a general dissatisfaction of governmental bureaucracies in poverty alleviation efforts, they needed 
to “have [their] men in both the executive and legislative government.” They finally elected 
Mohammad Basyir Ahmad, a local doctor who was also an LPM coordinator at Kelurahan 
Sugihwaras. Some of BKM Podosugih’s members shared openly that since 2001, they had been one 
of the civic groups that supported and militantly conducted Pak Basyir’s campaign at a grass-root 
level. BKM’s support was part of a mutual deal. To gain its support, Pak Basyir was required to 
openly declare his support for the community-based development method in his campaign platforms. 
After elected, he must support this method by proposing a legislation process that gives more 
autonomy to community self-help institutions operations.80 
 
BKM then supported Pak Anton as the candidate for the citywide forum BKM. This would expose 
him to members of other community self-help institutions (BKM) in the city of Pekalongan. When he 
was later elected as member of Forum LPM, they practically controlled the whole network of 
community-based development organizations in the city. This social mobilization strategy proved to 
be an effective way to reach the grassroots-level in a campaign. Pak Anton was also elected as a 
                                       
79 I was surprised to find Pak Anton in the mayor’s office when I was about to interview Dr. Basyir. A 
government official who would speak in anonymity jokingly told me that nobody has more access to the mayor 
compared to Pak Anton, not even the Head of the City Planning Bureau. 
80 In 2005, Mohamad Basyir Ahmad run for mayor with his 9 point platform: three of which was on education, 
one on small businesses, one on labor protection, and one point emphasizing that poverty alleviation effort must 
be performed with a community-based development method, utilizing the community self-help institution BKM 
platform.  
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DPRD member in 2009 just a few weeks before I could interview him. In Pak Anton’s own words: 
“We have conditioned our debtors [to elect particular candidates].”  
 
While social mobilization explains how Pak Anton and Pak Basyir gained grassroots’ votes, it does 
not explain how they gained their candidacy. Both of them were closely associated with Golkar, a 
political party. Pak Anton had been the city secretary of Golkar between 2000 and 2005 before 
running for DPRD seat, and Pak Basyir was a DPRD member from the same party between 1999 and 
2004 before he ran for mayor. Pak Anton was also an active member of Pak Basyir’s campaign team 
for the mayor position in 2005, because, as he claimed, that this was the only way he could assert 
BKM’s mission in the campaign. 
 
The fact that both Pak Anton and Pak Basyir were involved in a political party did not undermine the 
importance of their grassroots’ support. On the contrary, grassroots support was an important part of 
their victorious campaigns for their positions. If anything, their involvement with Golkar actually 
weakened their opportunity to gain votes, since Golkar was infamously associated with the New 
Order. In 1997, witnesses said 10,000 people attacked a Golkar office in Pekalongan in a violent riot 
before the fall of New Order.81 Through Pak Anton and Dr. Basyir’s governmental positions, for the 
first time in Pekalongan’s political history, Golkar had seats in both the executive and legislative 
bodies. Pekalongan historically had a base of traditional Moslem voters, and their votes are typically 
shared by Islamic parties, such as PPP (United Development Party), PKB (National Emergence 
Party), and PAN (National Mandate Party) even when the New Order was still in power.82 
 
In 2001, BKM Podosugih was elected as a regional coordinator of the Forum BKM Pantura, a 
network for community self-help institutions on the northern shore of Central Java.83 This forum 
                                       
81 New York Times; 5/21/1997, p8, 0p 
82 The victorious story of a BKM member running for a government office election is not unique to Pekalongan. 
I have at least found that in Central Java alone this also happens in Jogjakarta, Klaten and Banyumas. Nationally 
there is even more stories alike. 
83 Pantura (Pantai Utara) also commonly refers to the series of cities on the north shore of Java that grows along 
Pantura’s 1,300 km continuous street line. 
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subsumed 73 community self-help institutions from Kendal to Brebes, a 250 km distance. 
Membership varied from BKMs of mid- to large-cities like Pekalongan, Pemalang, and Brebes 
(population: 250,000) and mid- to small-cities like Kendal, Jepara, Sragen, Grobogan, and Kediri 
(population: less than 100,000). The self-help institutions had been actively communicating through 
monthly sHeryng sessions until major flooding in February 2002 made inter-city transportation on the 
island’s northern shore impossible. Although speculative, it is possible that BKM Podosugih’s grass-
root activism does not stop there. The BKM has also developed an ultra-regional network with BKMs 
from Sumatera Island’s cities of Medan, Padang, Payakumbuh, Padang Panjang, Bukittingi, Pesisir 
Selatan, and Sepuluh Kota. 
 
 
4. A Thin, Fine Line between Successful Grassroots Activism and a Political Hijack 
 
These findings on Podosugih highlight the strong connection between two events: Mayor Basyir’s 
election in Pekalongan and planned movements from BKM Podosugih’s cadres to put their agents in 
legislative and executive governments. This plan—tacit but exquisitely strategic and intensely 
coordinated—sought municipal governments’ recognition of community organizations in its legal 
framework. This advocacy resulted in legislation, which mandated resource provisions from the city 
for other communities to establish their own community-based organizations and made CBOs a 
strategic partner in the city’s poverty alleviation programs. Podosugih’s experience provides an 
exemplary model of how to successfully appropriate a decentralized poverty alleviation program. 
 
The case of Podosugih illustrates a sophisticated process of collective social learning. It illustrates that 
a community can practice self-empiricism through the form of annual poverty survey. Self-
empiricism would result in criticism against the state’s agenda of community participation. A 
previously state-supported UPP coincidentally promoted a collective self-knowledge in the form of 
understanding local poverty characteristics. The previously state-supported UPP also triggered 
collective self-direction and enabled communities to critically assess the government’s prescriptions 
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in poverty alleviation projects. They correctly questioned the DPRD’s requirement for greater 
infrastructure development in UPP implementation. BKM members understood that while such an 
allocation would benefit DPRD members’ political positions, it would not directly benefit their 
community members, and negotiated accordingly. 
 
Knowing that the state-prescribed infrastructure development program do not fit their community 
members’ interest in microloans, in the end they diverted from the state’s agenda by pressing their 
own poverty alleviation programs. As a result, state support, in the form of UPP money, was used for 
microcredit to help small local entrepreneurs, as well as to support a very powerful network of 
community organizations in the city and in the wider region of Java’s northern coast. This network 
effectively drew support for BKMs political activism. 
 
The case of Podosugih, however, also illustrates the contested notion of grassroots’ activism. 
Although successful, new elites, who were more comfortable with state agents, emerged from the 
advocacy process. Two of the new elites, Dr. Basyir and Pak Anton, even assumed governmental 
positions. Their elections demonstrate the delicate and intricate relationship between grassroots’ and 
government agendas. On one hand, they were elected to government positions by a successful 
grassroots campaign. On the other hand, they could not share the political rewards and monetary 
compensation from their governmental positions with the community organizations and members 
struggling to support their election. Whether their personal benefits gained from their elections exceed 
the general benefits received by community-based organizations in the city of Pekalongan is a matter 
of value judgment. This judgment determines whether one frames the UPP’s mobilization of its 
beneficiaries to draw political support as a manipulative hijack of community-based, grassroots 
organization or a successful grassroots activism campaign to advocate for community interests. Based 
on my observations, the initial motives—to advocate for a pro-poor policy through city ordinances—
of Dr. Basyir’s and Pak Anton’s candidacy proves completely altruistic. However, their commitment 
to community-based organizations and the interests of  poor people is subject to the test of time. 
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Chart 5. Framework of Podosugih’s Advocacy 
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V. Summary, Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
A. Summary 
 
1. Beyond State’s Agenda 
 
Can communities move beyond performing the State’s agenda in poverty alleviation projects?  
 
This research highlights a significant asymmetry between government and community’s agendas and 
scope of action for decentralized, community-based poverty alleviation management. Interviews with 
key decision-makers at the national level, government elites at the municipal level, as well as 
administrators at sub-district level, revealed that improving project efficiency and efficacy were the 
state’s unequivocal goals when delegating authority to communities. The simple and less bureaucratic 
structure of community organizations shortened projects’ time span, hence increasing efficiency. 
Engagement with beneficiaries in project implementation raised their sense of belonging. It also 
motivated citizens to contribute sweat equity, monetary donations, or land, hence increasing efficacy. 
In this sense, while BKMs received power from the government, but they still acted within the state’s 
agenda of development by carrying out the UPP. 
 
However, this research also provided insight into collective social learning, including increasing 
community organizations’ criticism toward the state’s prescription in development agenda. In 
Podosugih, the annual survey they conducted without any state agency influence strengthened their 
perceptions of local characteristics of urban poverty. This practice of self-empiricism raised their 
determination to reject the state’s prescription of infrastructure development and instead proposing 
greater allocation for a microcredit scheme. Podosugih’s learning process as a community proves that 
collective self-knowledge can be translated into a powerful sense of collective self-direction. This 
collective self-knowledge is the preliminary social capital for communities to expand their activism 
beyond the state’s agenda in development and poverty alleviation projects. 
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2. Appropriating Poverty Alleviation 
 
Can communities appropriate decentralized poverty alleviation programs and divert the state’s 
agenda to press their own?  
 
Experience from BKM Podosugih shows that BKM members can strategically decide when they need 
to make an alliance with government agents (i.e, the Lurah) or to challenge the state’s position. While 
the nomination of Pak Anton and Pak Basyir was primarily driven by political elites, BKM’s militant 
campaign support was an example of diversion from the initial intention of BKM and UPP’s 
establishment. In other circumstances, one may perceive this diversion as manipulative. Mayor Basyir 
could be seen as co-opting an official position with the noble intention of poverty alleviation. 
However, because BKM’s goal was recognition by the municipal government in its legal framework, 
and the main tangible delivery of this effort was legislation that would help other communities 
establishing their own community organization, I would categorize this process as advocacy. 
Podosugih is an exemplary model of a successful appropriator of a decentralized poverty alleviation 
program. 
 
Despite BKM Yosorejo’s brilliant advocacy against the local factory, indicating that they were more 
than project managers for the UPP, they constantly negotiated with the government’s agent. Naturally, 
the negotiation process involves a “give and take.” In his effort to shape BKM members’ perception 
on citizens’ rights and responsibilities and pacify their potentially aggressive collective action, the 
Lurah opened the Kelurahan’s physical and political space, followed by BKM members using 
Kelurahan’s resources in the form of workspace, money, staff, and other operational resources. 
Moreover, the BKM also utilized the Lurah’s personal and professional social networks to smoothen 
the negotiation process. Although it perhaps a less sophisticated achievement compared with the case 
of Podosugih, the case of Yosorejo provides a good example of a community’s ability to capitalize on 
opportunities opened by general decentralization policy. 
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3. Setting the Planning Arena 
 
Can communities advocate for their needs without engaging in a planning process separate from the 
state-run processes and exclusive of governmental agents? 
 
Both Yosorejo and Podosugih had exhibited cooperative behavior with their governmental 
counterpart. Although in Podosugih, the BKM challenged higher authority, none of the BKM 
movements in both Yosorejo and Podosugih used adversary actions, such as protests and conflict. 
Evidently, advocacy planning in Yosorejo was transparent and open to other actors, including 
government agents. Their efforts were goal-oriented and to some extent, BKM members indicated 
they would be willing to use any means necessary to achieve their goal. Even though the advocacy 
process in Podosugih was motivated by significant structural change (i.e., the way municipal 
government deal with poverty alleviation projects), decentralization enabled their movements in the 
political and legal framework. In both observed communities, a strong sense of “sticking to the rules” 
to achieve their goals existed. 
 
A critical examination of state’s framework and its implementation of poverty alleviation project is 
necessary. The state operated through a territorial approach, where the spatial definition of a place is 
bound to its administrative description, which the policy to establish BKMs at a Kelurahan level 
demonstrates. While this definition conforms to the existing administrative operational framework of 
governance, in reality, community’s cohesion and urban problems sometimes extend beyond this 
administrative boundary. If a community-based organization is forced to only focus on its 
administratively assigned territory, they would not be able to effectively address the complex, 
multilayered socio-economic issues their community members face. 
 
This research supports the claim that successful community-based advocacy should expand its 
territorial reach in addressing community members’ problems. Community-based organizations 
should shift their focus from addressing communities’ interests in their sole geographic boundaries to 
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their locus in a wider urban social, economic, and physical context. This thinking was especially 
prevalent in Podosugih’s movement to form a regional (city-wide) and ultra-regional (inter-city) 
network with other BKMs. These regional and ultra-regional networks were effective mechanisms to 
exchange thoughts and experiences, and accelerated the BKM’s learning process to be more critical 
toward the state’s agenda. More sophisticated operations, including negotiations with local 
government offices on infrastructure planning, job creation, and unprecedented political pressure 
toward environmentally unfriendly land-use provisions followed this learning process. In Yosorejo, 
where the BKM was only comfortable to ally itself with the sub-district administration (Kelurahan 
office) in their operations, their advocacy efforts (and results) were not as substantial and focused 
only on their local geographic area. 
 
 
4. Laying out the Modus Operandi 
 
What is a possible modus operandi for community organizations to appropriate decentralization to 
press their own agendas? 
 
Yosorejo had used strategic alliance as its mechanism to appropriate decentralization. They openly 
allied with the sub-district administrator (the Lurah), shared work space together, and used all the 
Kelurahan’s resources, such as office instruments and personnel. There was, however, a thin line 
between this strategic alliance and manipulative co-optation. Since BKM gained legitimacy as the 
local governing body of the kelurahan by occupying the government office, one could perceive 
BKM’s strategy more as co-optation of the Kelurahan than advocacy and collaboration. The reader 
should be wary, though, that co-optation can occur reciprocally, of the BKM by the Lurah. In some 
cases, there was evidence that BKM members actually helped the Lurah to do his job. Since BKM 
members and BKM secretary are volunteers and not paid employers, the Kelurahan could also be 
perceived as manipulative or exploitative. 
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Some interviews indicated that the Lurah significantly influenced BKM leaders’ and members’ 
theoretical framework on understanding decentralization, the shared burden of responsibility in 
development, and citizenship. In the end these means of perception transfer pacifies the potentially 
aggressive collective action by people. The case of Yosorejo highlights the complexity of community-
based organizations’ engagement with the state in planning processes. While a successful example of 
community’s appropriation of decentralization policy, it also exposes the thin, fine line between 
strategic alliance between the state and community-based organizations and the co-optation of civil 
society by the state. 
 
Podosugih’s modus operandi was clear and transparent. First, BKM hitch hiked the government by 
placing their agent (Mayor Basyir) in the most important office of municipal government. After BKM 
consolidated their power and Mayor Basyir could create more conducive environment in the 
governmental bureaucracy for more significant change, they pressed for legislation that recognizes 
BKM as a main partner of the government’s poverty alleviation project. The epilogue of this process 
was when BKM put more agents in both executive and legislative government bodies. At this point, 
they have redirected the municipal government’s poverty alleviation policy toward more participatory 
and bottom-up approaches.  
 
The case of Podosugih, however, also illustrates the contested notion of successful grassroots 
activism. On one hand, they are exemplary models of communities’ democratic struggle to place their 
agents in state institutions. On the other hand, the political rewards and monetary compensation these 
agents receive from their governmental positions are personal benefits instead of general benefits 
received by community-based organizations in the city of Pekalongan. One could frame the 
mobilization of UPP beneficiaries to draw a political support as a manipulative hijack of community-
based, grassroots organizations or successful grassroots activism to advocate for citizens’ interests. 
The initial motives—to advocate for the enactment of a pro-poor city policy—of Dr. Basyir and Pak 
Anton’s candidacies seemed completely altruistic. However, their commitment to community-based 
organizations and the interests of poor people is subject to the test of time. 
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B. Conclusion 
 
In the observed communities, UPP had been an effective social planning instrument to develop 
community organizations’ collective criticism toward the state’s agenda. UPP’s requirement for 
communities to conduct an annual survey to generate their own data on local poverty is part of 
community’s self-empiricism. This leads to the formulation of a collective self-knowledge and the 
creation of self-direction to challenge the state’s prescription in community-based planning and 
development. More importantly, this was followed by their shifting focus from addressing 
communities’ interests in their sole geographic boundaries toward thinking of their locus in a wider 
urban social, economic, and physical context. Two BKMs actively challenged the state’s agenda—
decentralizing development by encouraging citizen participation (through labor) and contributions 
(through monetary donations)—and pressed their own agendas. Decentralization allowed these 
actions without the necessity of establishing a different planning process exclusive of government 
agents and the state’s influence. On the contrary, BKM operated transparently and openly by forging 
a strategic alliance with the government. They even conducted a more aggressive process by 
mobilizing their grassroots networks to elect their agents to redirect policies from within 
governmental institutions.  
 
 
C. Recommendations for Future Study 
 
This study, based on observations of two and a half months, provides a glimpse into the complex 
processes of decentralization in Central Java. Exploratory in its nature, this study uncovered 
significant, albeit unexpected, issues. Perhaps more importantly, it found BKM’s establishment led to 
the emergence of a new elite group. In both Yosorejo and Podosugih BKM members are now 
considered a new generation of elites because they possess the authority in community governance. 
These new leaders were unknown before they were BKM members. Their extensive exposure to 
planning processes, project management, and professional networking with BKM members and 
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BKM’s government counterparts greatly enhance their capacity for advocacy. However, the same 
learning process also widened the gap between them and the rest of the community members. 
Although in the communities observed this did not prevent communication between BKM members 
and beneficiaries or hinder their integration in social life, their involvement with BKM operations 
provided them with capacities that no other community members could obtain without getting 
involved in BKM governance. 
 
This process diversified the community’s elite group, by creating a new elite group that did not 
previously belong to governmental bureaucracy or existing cultural and religious institutions. 
However, other than identifying its existence, this study did not address this diversification process. 
BKM members, especially in Podosugih where they hold government offices, may become the new 
repressive power that perpetuates self-interest.  
 
This research explains how, under decentralization, poor communities evolve to become empowered 
to act as advocates for their interests in  strategic planning processes. By identifying the fundamental 
phases in BKMs’ evolution and highlighting the processes of collective social learning, this research 
enriches our understanding of the complex process of decentralization and poverty alleviation.  
 
However, it is necessary to keep the scholarly planning discussion focused on what matters to most 
developing nations: What is the most effective method to free a large portion of their populations 
from poverty and unequal economic opportunities? Therefore, this research calls for further research 
to question, challenge, and confront the existing claims on decentralization and its positive impact on 
poverty alleviation. Among the questions that need to be raised in the future are as follows: 
1. What are the economic consequences of advocacy at the community level? In a developing 
nation where resources are scarce, do advocacy processes lead to more desirable resource 
allocation in the interest of poor communities? 
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2. What happens when communities in similarly situated contexts develop the capacity for 
advocacy at different rates? Would scarce resources still be distributed in a desirable manner 
if communities with different advocacy capacities develop competition among themselves? 
3. How can government and state agencies learn to use this experience for policy intervention? 
At which local level should a decentralizing government play a larger role in policy 
intervention for poverty alleviation purposes? 
These questions needed to be answered by more in-depth, longitudinal researches that extend over a 
longer time span. 
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Informed Consent 
 
Research on Urban Poverty Project - 2009 
 
Ahmad Gamal 
Dept. of Urban & Regional Planning, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
This consent applies for the use of data generated in UPP program evaluation between May and 
July 2009 for the purpose of a separate proposed research. By signing this document you agreed 
to provide consent to allow the researcher to use your previous response in UPP program 
evaluation for this research purpose. The research is a basis of academic publications in the form 
of a master‟s thesis or an article in an academic journal. 
 
Purpose of research 
 
UPP‟s considerable success in micro-credit distribution infrastructure development and 
charitable donations for poor population needs to be followed by a significant integration of poor 
people into local planning and development processes. This research aims at investigating their 
participation and involvement in that process as part of government‟s continuing effort to 
increase its accountability and democratic decision-making processes. 
 
Interview Procedures 
 
This interview was conducted with city mayors / county heads, heads of local planning agencies, 
sub-district administrators, and numerous volunteers to this program as recommended by 
program coordinator of the city / county. This interview has been scheduled at a mutually agreed 
time and place between participant and interviewer. No personal questions will be asked during 
this interview. Interviews only explored challenges and opportunities as recognized by the staff 
of governmental organizations or volunteers of UPP. Interviews were tape-recorded. The length 
of the interview was around 1 (one) hour and could be repeated by mutual agreement between 
interviewer and participant. 
 
Risks 
 
Interviews would not affect your employability by the government or as a volunteer of UPP. You 
have the full discretion not to reveal any of your response to any question if you consider that is 
to bring any emotional discomfort and / or will result in unwanted consequences to your 
professional and / or social position.  
 
Benefit 
 
While you will not experience direct benefit from this interview, this research will benefit the 
whole program. By this evaluation you could express your feelings, complaints, critiques, and 
your suggestions to UPP to improve poverty alleviation programs in the future. 
 
117 
 
Informed Consent 
 
Alternative Process  
 
You have been provided the option to participate in another focus group discussion if you feel 
more comfortable speaking in public. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
Your response in the interview will be a primary resource of evaluation of UPP. National 
Consultant as the main managing organization of UPP has full discretion release the result of this 
evaluation in a publication, or to release the data to other party as long as it is for the purpose of 
poverty alleviation program. However, all audio-files and transcription of this interview will 
remain undisclosed. As a public officer, most likely your personal identity will be disclosed as a 
contributor to this research. 
 
Voluntariness 
 
Participation in this research is completely voluntary. You will not receive any monetary 
compensation and will not be required to pay to be able to participate in this process. If you 
decide to cancel your participation in the process or prefer to withdraw from the research by not 
providing consent to use your previous response in the program evaluation, it will not affect your 
employability to the government and / or your service as a volunteer to UPP. 
 
About the Researcher 
 
The researcher is Ahmad Gamal, a graduate student at University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, United States of America. He was an intern at National Consultant of UPP for the 
period of May – July 2009. National Consultant has assigned Mr. Gamal to travel and conduct 
interviews, focus group discussions as well as observations of UPP program implementation. In 
the end of this process, Mr. Gamal is required to present his findings in a meeting of UPP 
stakeholders, National Consultant, National Planning Agency, and a World Bank representative. 
Questions, critics and suggestions may be addressed to Mr. Gamal at 0811-842-721, or to 
program coordinator at your city / county.  
 
Final Consent Statement 
 
I understand the explanation within this document and I am willing to participate in this research. 
I give permission to Mr. Ahmad Gamal to use my responses in the previous program evaluation 
as the basis for his research. 
 
Full Name  ________________________________ 
 
Signature  ________________________________ 
 
Place / Date  ________________________________ 
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Penjelasan Proses 
 
Riset Program Pengentasan Kemiskinan Perkotaan – 2009 
 
Ahmad Gamal 
Dept. of Urban & Regional Planning, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
 
Penjelasan ini berlaku untuk penggunaan data yang telah Anda berikan pada program evaluasi 
yang telah dilakukan pada periode Mei s/d Juli 2009. Dengan menandatangani surat ini Anda 
memberikan izin kepada periset untuk menggunakan hasil wawancara yang telah dilakukan 
sebagai bahan riset untuk tesis pasca sarjana dan artikel pada jurnal ilmiah. 
 
Tujuan Riset 
 
Keberhasilan dalam bidang pelaksanaan dan penyelengaraan dana bergulir, pembangunan 
infrastruktur dan pemberian bantuan bagi warga miskin perlu dilanjutkan dengan keberhasilan 
dalam proses integrasi masyarakat ke dalam proses pembangunan dan perencanaan. Evaluasi ini 
diadakan untuk meneliti lebih lanjut keterlibatan warga miskin dalam proses tersebut sebagai 
bagian dari upaya peningkatan akuntabilitas dan kehidupan berdemokrasi. 
 
Prosedur Wawancara 
 
Wawancara dilaksanakan oleh pelaksana tugas evaluasi terhadap walikota/bupati, kepala biro 
perencanaan daerah, lurah, dan beberapa sukarelawan sesuai rekomendasi koordinator tingkat 
kota / kabupaten. Jadwal wawancara ditentukan berdasarkan perjanjian antara Anda dan 
pelaksana tugas evaluasi. Tidak ada informasi pribadi yang diminta dalam wawancara ini. 
Wawancara hanya akan digunakan untuk mencari tahu tantangan-tantangan dan kesempatan-
kesempatan yang ditemukan oleh elemen pemerintah daerah maupun sukarelawan dalam 
program P2KP. Proses ini akan didokumentasikan menggunakan perekam suara. Wawancara 
dapat berlangsung selama 1 (satu) jam dan dapat diulangi / dilanjutkan di lain waktu yang 
disetujui bersama oleh pelaksana tugas evaluasi dan Anda. 
 
Resiko 
 
Wawancara ini tidak mempengaruhi jabatan dan pekerjaan Anda sebagai bagian dari 
pemerintahan daerah atau sukarelawan P2KP. Anda berhak tidak menjawab pertanyaan yang 
diajukan apabila menurut Anda pertanyaan tersebut dapat menimbulkan emosi negatif dan/atau 
meberi konsekuensi buruk terhadap pekerjaan Anda. 
 
 
Manfaat 
 
Manfaat dari wawancara ini tidak akan terasa langsung bagi Anda pribadi, namun dapat menjadi 
bahan informasi yang sangat penting bagi perbaikan program P2KP. Melalui evaluasi ini Anda 
dapat menyampaikan keluhan, kritik, dan usulan bagi perbaikan program. 
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Prosedur Alternatif 
 
Selain wawancara ini, evaluasi akan dilakukan dengan metode diskusi kelompok. Apabila Anda 
merasa lebih nyaman berbicara dalam kelompok, Anda dapat memilih untuk ikut serta dalam 
proses tersebut. 
 
Kerahasiaan 
 
Wawancara ini akan digunakan sebagai bahan evaluasi dan Konsultan Nasional P2KP memiliki 
hak penuh untuk mempublikasikan hasil evaluasi ini atau memberikan data untuk keperluan 
pihak lain selama masih dalam rangka program pengentasan kemiskinan. Walaupun demikian, 
rekaman wawancara dan catatan evaluasi tidak akan diberikan kepada pihak ketiga. Sebagai 
pejabat publik, nama Anda akan disebutkan sebagai kontributor evaluasi ini. 
 
Kesukarelaan 
 
Evaluasi ini bersifat sukarela seluruhnya. Anda tidak akan dibayar dan tidak akan dimintai 
bayaran untuk ikut serta dalam proses ini. Apabila Anda memutuskan untuk tidak ikut serta 
dalam proses evaluasi ini, tidak akan mempengaruhi jabatan dan pekerjaan Anda sebagai bagian 
dari pemerintahan daerah atau sukarelawan P2KP.  
 
Tentang Periset 
 
Pelaksana riset ini adalah Ahmad Gamal, mahasiswa pasca-sarjana University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, Amerika Serikat. Yang bersangkutan sedang menjalani pemagangan di 
Konsultan Nasional P2KP. Tugas ini mengharuskan yang bersangkutan untuk melakukan 
perjalanan dan menghubungi Anda untuk keperluan evaluasi program P2KP di tingkat daerah 
dan nasional. Di akhir periode evaluasi ini Sdr. Gamal akan diharuskan untuk membuat 
rekomendasi tertulis dan menyampaikannya pada pertemuan para pemangku kepentingan P2KP, 
yaitu Konsultan Nasional, Bappenas, dan perwakilan Bank Dunia. Kami sangat menghargai 
bantuan Anda kepada Sdr. Ahmad Gamal untuk keperluan evaluasi ini. Pertanyaan, kritik dan 
saran terhadap proses ini dapat diajukan kepada Sdr. Ahmad Gamal melalui telfon 0811-842-
721, atau melalui koordinator P2KP tingkat kota / kabupaten Anda masing-masing. 
 
Pernyataan Persetujuan 
 
Saya yang bertanda tangan di bawah ini menyatakan mengerti sepenuhnya penjelasan tentang 
penggunaan data dan bersedia berpartisipasi dalam riset dengan mengijinkan Saudara Ahmad 
Gamal untuk menggunakan data yang telah dikumpulkan untuk tujuan tersebut. 
 
Nama Lengkap ________________________________ 
 
Tanda Tangan  ________________________________ 
Tempat / Tanggal ________________________________ 
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Respondent’s name:   Researcher’s Name: 
Professional title: Date: 
Agency: Location: 
 
Key Informant Interview Guide 
Revised: June 8, 2009 
 
Contextual Background 
1. What had been the most prevalent drive for decentralization policy in respondent‟s context? Is 
there another aspect aside from political pressure to the governmental authority? 
2. What is the most prevalent intention for decentralization process? Has decentralization of 
governmental responsibilities followed with decentralization of authorities?  
(Relate these questions with respondent‟s agency position, whether national, provincial, city or 
community level) 
 
Community Planning Advocacy 
1. How can decentralization trend enable communities to further participate in strategic 
development planning process? More specifically, how can community-level decisions be able to 
influence local planning agency‟s pro-poor development strategy? What are mechanisms that it 
has to go through? What are the barriers? 
2. What are the fundamental phases of community evolution from being “poor” into a “self-
advocating” one? What are the pre-requisites for this to happen? 
3. How does socio, cultural, political and historical factors affect inter-scalar planning mechanism 
and en/discourage community‟s participation in higher level planning process? What are the most 
evident characteristics identified in a self-advocating community? 
4. How significant is the role of facilitators and city-level coordinators in the process of capacity 
building for self-advocacy? What is the strategy to pass on advocating capacity from local 
facilitators to community to provide them with necessary independence? 
(These questions may be more relevant to be asked to CSI members, facilitators and city-level 
coordinators) 
 
Planning Agency Paradigm Shift 
1. How had decentralization trend forced local government to accommodate communities‟ 
participation in strategic development planning process? More specifically, how had local 
planning agencies changed in dealing with communities for a pro-poor development strategy? 
What are mechanisms that it has to go through? What are the barriers? 
2. What are the fundamental phases of local planning and governmental agencies evolution in the 
transition into a participative agency? What are the pre-requisites for this to happen? 
3. How does socio, cultural, political and historical factors affect inter-scalar planning mechanism 
and en/discourage planning agency to involve community participation in strategic planning 
process? What are the most evident characteristics differ community-level planning processes and 
governmental planning processes? 
4. How significant is the role of facilitators and city-level coordinators in advocating the process of 
paradigm shift for self-advocacy in local governmental level? What are the challenges to deal 
with this type of advocacy? 
(These questions may be more relevant to be asked to heads of local planning agencies, city mayors 
and other relevant governmental officials) 
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Description of Focus Group   Date 
Moderator’s Name Location 
 
Focus Group Discussion Guide 
Revised: June 13, 2009 
Perception on Poverty 
This section aims at uncovering unique local perception on poverty, how poverty characteristics differ at 
personal, household, and communal level, and what/who is perceived as the responsible cause for 
poverty. Questions asked may vary, but will be based on these pointing guidelines: 
1) Do you perceive your community in general as poor/prosperous? Explore specific criteria used by 
discussant to identify poverty at communal level. 
2) Is the community homo/heterogeneous in terms of poverty? Can you describe variations within 
the community in their poverty/prosperity status? Explore specific criteria used by discussant to 
identify poverty at household and personal level. 
3) Is there a particular type of household dominantly represented in the community? (e.g. single-
family, multi-family, single-person, widow-headed household, etc) If the answer is yes, how does 
this particular type correlate with the criteria of poverty? Explore contextual economic functions 
of household members and local assumptions on poverty. 
4) What is the dynamics of poverty in your community? Has poverty been generally in/decreasing in 
the last 5, 10, or 20 years? Specify local events having possible direct relation with the 
in/decrease of poverty within the community. Explore the economic base of the community and 
its level of dependence to particular industry. 
5) Can you imagine an alternative future if abovementioned events did not occur? To whom will 
you consult this alternative future, if you ever had an access? Who, in your perception, will have 
enough power to prevent such events occur? Explore the local assumptions on most responsible 
parties for poverty and its alleviation efforts. 
6) To whom do you think I should talk to if I expect to better understand this issue? Explore local 
assumptions about who understands poverty better from in/outside the community, and 
community‟s self-appreciation on internal/local knowledge. 
 
Community-Level Collective Action Inventory 
This section aims at generating an inventory of community-level collective action, initiator, leading 
positions, beneficiaries, executing agents, and their dynamics over time. The inventory was meant to 
measure how evolved the community is in generating social movement. The social indicator of this 
evolution is community‟s independence level for planning and implementing their community-level 
collective action. The institutional indicator of this evolution is whether the community is capable to 
generate planning at tactical (mid-run), strategic (long-run), or merely reactive-responsive (short-run) 
time frame. 
1) Please identify poverty alleviation efforts undertaken in your community within the last 5, 10, or 
20 years.  
2) Please identify infrastructure (water, sanitation, informal settlement) upgrade efforts undertaken 
in your community within the last 5, 10, or 20 years.  
3) Please identify health and social welfare programs undertaken in your community within the last 
5, 10, or 20 years.  
(To all questions above, explore to what extent community members are involved in planning and 
implementation of each program/project, how sophisticated decision-making process are performed, how 
evolved each program/project is in term of institutionalization, and whether each program/project benefit 
the community in general, targeted households, or particular segment of the community. Enrich 
information with personal interviews.) 
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Community-Level Governance and Participatory Planning 
This section aims at providing a valid basis for analysis of inter-scalar planning and how community-level 
planning is advocated at higher level planning process. Significant indicator analyzed is community‟s 
independence in decision-making process, participation level of decision-making at community-level, and 
internal/external drives for community-level decision-making/planning. 
1) Please describe leadership in your community. Explore possibilities of (in) formal leadership and 
different life realms (age, wealth, ownership of production factors, employment and education; 
political and religious associations) in the community. 
2) Please describe how power is shared among these different leaders. Explore the dynamics 
between formal-informal leaders and who takes what decisions for whom. 
3) How is local leadership changing in the last 5, 10, or 20 years? 
4) How is local leadership affected by external influences? Identify interventions had been 
performed by national/local government, NGOs, political parties. 
5) How involved are each of you personally in decision-making processes? Expect every focus 
group participant to provide answer. Silence may be interpreted as not being involved at all. 
Explore methods of how participation is generated in community-level decision-making 
processes. 
6) Have you been always in agreement with a decision made for the community? Have you heard of 
any people not in agreement with a decision made for the community? How is the negotiation 
process performed within community? Explore how different interests are accommodated / 
ignored in decision-making process and how conflicts are resolved. 
(To all questions above expect a detailed illustration with specific examples based on recent case, if 
possible) 
 
Community Self-Advocacy 
This section aims at picturing the community‟s capacity for advocacy. Questions asked are to identify 
community members‟ satisfaction level of decisions and plans made by local planning agencies, internal 
efforts to buffer planning failure in targeting beneficiaries, and efforts to advocate community‟s interest at 
higher level. 
1) How do you feel in general with programs initiated by local government in poverty alleviation 
program, health care system, or infrastructure development? Do you consider your feeling as 
widely shared among others? Explore the subtlest dissatisfaction embedded in verbal 
communication. Specify events/projects/programs/plans criticized by the group. 
2) What did you do when you were dissatisfied? What did the community do when this 
dissatisfaction was a widespread one? Did the community tried to consult/confront local 
government for resolution? Explore community‟s awareness of intrinsic rights to benefit from 
government and governance, and their capacity to generate social movement. 
3) Who were the main actors for this movement? Was the negotiation delegated to community 
leaders or performed by mass movement? If this task was performed by delegations, who were 
trusted by the community to do so? Why were they trusted for the task? Explore the community‟s 
capacity to advocate change and the internalization level of this capacity. Expect the group to 
identify internal figures as well as external actors such as NGO activists. Explore local 
assumptions on responsible figures for this task. 
4) What was the main channel for this movement? Did the community/delegations utilize formal 
channel with elaborate political processes, strategic information with media pressure, or informal 
strategy with personal negotiations with influential figures in decision-making institutions? 
Explore sophistication level of the method for advocacy. 
5) Were you satisfied with the result of this movement? What did you do when you/others in the 
community were dissatisfied? Explore the strength of internal drive for advocacy. 
 
 
